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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
  
A developing nation such as Botswana needs to have legislation 
and infrastructure in place catering for most if not all of its economic 
needs. This enables a country to compete and maintain recognition in the 
global economy. This paper advocates for development and operation of 
a competition law with particular focus on mergers and whether their 
provisions are satisfactory. 
Competition law prohibits restrictive trade practices by ascertaining 
whether a specified type of economic activity has the effect of preventing 
or substantially lessening competition. Whilst a firm may build market 
power through unilateral conduct, the easiest way for a firm to establish 
or enhance market power is by acquiring or merging with other firms.1 
Mergers deal with changes in the structure of a market or industry.2 
Although not abuses of dominant power as such, there is a need to 
regulate mergers and acquisitions because of the potential for abuse that 
such concentrations of market power carry with them.3  
Mergers have potential to result in an entity having a higher market 
share than what a competition act authorizes. The regulation of mergers 
is imperative for assessing whether its end results are anti-competitive or 
pro-competitive. Prohibition of restrictive practices in competition 
legislation is two fold. It may either be per se or it may allow for the use of 
a rule of reason. Where an economic activity is per se prohibited it cannot 
be justified. Where it allows for a rule of reason there is an allowance for 
argument to justify it.  
Based on the foregoing as well as the explanations and 
discussions which will be alluded to in this paper, the regulation of 
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mergers in Botswana was elected to analyze the competency of its 
provisions. The timing for promulgation of the legislation has been 
impeccable as it gave immediate rise to filing of mergers with 
international companies.4  
1.2 FACTS ON BOTSWANA 
1.2.1 BACKGROUND   
 
Previously a British Protectorate the Republic of Botswana 
attained Independence in 1966. The country has been enjoying a multi 
party democracy for the past four decades with no political turmoil.5 It has 
uninterrupted civilization, leadership, progressive social policies and 
significant capital investment; which has made it one of the most stable 
economies in Africa. Botswana is well known for its high HIV/AIDS 
infection rates and one of Africa’s most progressive and comprehensive 
programs for dealing with the disease.6 The current President of 
Botswana is Seretse Khama Ian Khama, who has been in power since 
April 2008.7 His Vice President is Ponatshego Kedikilwe who was 
appointed in August 2012.8 
1.2.2 GEOGRAPHY 
 
Botswana is a landlocked country in the heart of Southern Africa.  
Botswana shares its borders with Namibia in the west and north, Zambia 
in the north, Zimbabwe in the north east and South Africa in the east and 
south.9 The country covers an area of 581,730 square kilometres; much 
of the land is flat and covered with thick sand layers in the Kalahari 
Desert. It is approximately 1,000 metres above sea level.10 
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 The first merger to be filed and authorized in Botswana was between Alexander Forbes and 
Marsh UK. 
5
 https:/www.cia.gov/library/public accessed on 15 May 2013. 
6
 Ibid 5. 
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 Ibid 5. 
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 Ibid 5. 
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 Botswana Report to the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) 2010 at p 7. 
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Rainfall varies from 650mm per year in the north-east to less than 
250mm in south-west. Drought is a recurring problem although in the 
early 2000’s record rainfall brought serious flooding. Botswana 
experiences extremes in climate, with cold winters and hot summers.11 
The nation is rich in mineral deposits. Diamond, coal, copper and 
nickel are mined in large quantities. Other minerals that are mined 
include gold, soda ash and salt. The country has a semi arid landscape 
with only approximately 5 per cent of the land being uncultivated. Cattle 
ranching is the most significant agricultural enterprise. Farming is mainly 
at subsistence level and relies on cattle, sheep, goats, maize, sorghum, 
beans, peanuts, cotton seed and other dry land crops.12 
 1.2.3 PEOPLE 
 
The US Central Intelligence Agency estimates that as at July 2013 
the population was 2, 127, 285.13 This estimate takes into account the 
effects of access mortality due to AIDS; this can result in lower life 
expectancy, higher mortality, higher death rate, lower population growth 
rates and distribution of population by age and sex that would otherwise 
be expected. 
The population is predominantly Tswana with 78.2 per cent being 
Tswana speaking people. The two official languages are English and 
Setswana. Other languages spoken are Kalanga 7.9 per cent, 
Sekgalagadi 2.8 per cent, English 2.1per cent, other 8.6 per cent and 
unspecified 0.4 per cent.14  
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 Ibid 9 at p 8. 
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 Ibid 5. 
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Botswana has maintained one of the world’s highest economic 
growth rates since attaining independence.15 There has however been 
negative economic growth in 2009 with the economic sector shrinking by 
30 per cent after the global crisis reduced the demand for Botswana’s 
diamonds.16 Although the economy recovered in 2010, GDP growth has 
slowed down. Through fiscal discipline and sound management, 
Botswana transformed itself from one of the poorest countries in the 
world to a middle-income country with a per capita of GDP of US$16 800 
in 2012. Diamond trading has fuelled much of the expansion and 
currently accounts for more than one-third of GDP, 70-80 per cent of 
export earnings and about one-third government revenues.17  
 At present a major international diamond company, the Diamond 
Trading Company of Botswana (DTCB) has signed a 10 year deal with 
Botswana to move its diamond aggregation and trading business from 
London to Gaborone by the end of 2013. The move will support 
Botswana’s downstream diamond industry.18  
1.2 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
The purpose of this study is to asses how competition law has 
evolved in Botswana and how the Competition Act (the Act) came into 
existence. It will outline and highlight all the processes and time that went 
into finally drafting a bill which was finally assented to by Parliament. It 
will answer the question whether mergers have been adequately 
provided for in Botswana. Until recently Botswana did not have legislation 
providing for competition law.19 The government, together with 
researchers and economists saw the need for development of a 
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 Ibid 5. 
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 Ibid 5. 
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competition regime to regulate this sector. The highlights and short-
comings of this process will be noted and assessed as having contributed 
to the nature of the legislation as it now is.  
The provisions of Part X20 of the Competition Act 2009 will be 
brought to the fore. The provisions drafted for merger regulation in the 
Act form the basis and control of mergers in Botswana. Promulgation of 
competition legislation, as previously stated, is imperative for purposes of 
fostering economic growth in Botswana. In so far as mergers are 
concerned there might be growth in that international companies and 
organizations will be likely to invest in Botswana companies and possibly 
merge with them or even take them over. In this regard, the legislation 
providing a competition regime should be able to fulfil needs of economic 
contributors locally and internationally. This makes it necessary to asses 
whether provision for mergers in the Act successfully acts as an aid in 
commercial growth and additionally serves the proper purpose which it 
was meant to.  
In the author’s view, the reason why a piece of legislation has to 
undergo amendments at a later stage arises from drafting errors and 
oversights. In addition the history of a particular country is important in 
the drafting of an Act as it is that history that contributes to the current 
state of the economy and therefore history should also be a consideration 
in the drafting of legislation. 
1.3 SYNOPSIS OF CHAPTERS  
 
Chapter Two will discuss the development of competition law in 
Botswana. The chapter will address the following issues; the origin of 
competition law, and its development in Botswana taking into 
consideration the drafting and implementation of the Act and what it 
sought to achieve. This development can be traced as far back as 1996 
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with the WTO Competition Policy21 and will be followed by Regional 
Trade Agreements22 which obliged member states to begin the process 
of developing competition policies and eventually drafting legislation. 
Concurrently with these regional agreements, Botswana went on to draft 
an Economic Mapping Report.23 After submission of the Report, other 
national policies leading up to drafting of the Act were implemented. 
These will be discussed in line with the question if this paper.  
Chapter Three will expound on the provisions for merger 
regulation in terms of the Act. It will analyze sections which have 
practically become the reason for contentious issues in merger regulation 
and also commend those that foster for the aims of competition. Further, 
where there appears to be any likely problems or issues of contention 
with respect to merger regulation these will be assessed. Concerns in 
respect of merger threshold and operation of public interest will be 
brought to light. This chapter will also discuss some of the merger 
decisions of the Competition Authority since it started operating in 2011.   
Chapter Four will provide a comparative analysis. This scrutiny will 
be between competition regimes in South Africa and Zambia. It will 
explore how each of these jurisdictions has developed their Competition 
Law in respect of mergers and make comparisons with Botswana. 
Zambia and South Africa have been particularly selected for the 
comparative study as the competition laws of these jurisdictions were 
used for benchmarking purposes in drafting of the Act. The chapter will 
expound on what Botswana has benefited from and what it desisted from 
doing and more importantly what improvements may be relevant and 
necessary going forward in Botswana. 
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 Hartzenburg, Trudi ‘Competition Policy in SADC’ 2002 Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies 
Annual Forum 1. 
22
 Southern African Customs Union Agreement 2002 and the 2004 Amendment as well as the 
Southern African Development Community Agreement on Trade 2000. 
23
 The final report on this Policy was drafted by the Botswana Institute for Development Policy 












Chapter Five will be the concluding chapter. This Chapter will give 
final remarks on the core elements of this mini dissertation and also make 
recommendations in respect of main issues deciphered. 
1.4 REASON FOR COMPARITIVE ANALYSIS 
 
 Since Competition Law is still very much in its infancy stage and 
the legislation is relatively new, it is important to look at how other 
countries have provided for the regulation of mergers and made 
amendments to these provisions over time. The comparative analysis will 
also be used to highlight any mistakes that countries with older 
competition law regimes made, which the Botswana legislation has been 
able to avoid, or those that are similar and may need to be rectified at a 
later stage. 
The two countries selected for the comparative analysis are one of 
the first four countries in Southern Africa to have a competition policy.24 It 
will be interesting to assess how their competition law has evolved over 
the years and draw lessons from same. 
1.5 METHODOLOGY 
 
This research will be desk-top based. The Competition Act will be 
critically analyzed in so far as it relates to merger regulation. There will 
also be an analysis of the jurisprudence on the subject matter. 
International and regional agreements on Competition law and policy will 
also be used. Legislation and jurisprudence from other countries will be 
used for the comparative analysis.  
  
                                                          
24












CHAPTER TWO: DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION LAW IN 
BOTSWANA 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The Competition Act was passed in 2009.25 The road towards 
promulgating the Act took close to a decade. The benefits of the 
competition legislation include economic improvement nationally, by 
enhancing and ensuring fair trading practices and competition. At an 
international level, competition legislation makes a country more 
attractive to foreign investors. In relation to mergers, large multinational 
companies seeking to merge with companies in Botswana will want to 
know whether there is a proper regulatory frame work in place, thus 
ensuring that their interests are safeguarded. Moreover from an 
international perspective, if parent or holding companies decide to merge, 
their affiliates around the world would also have to engage in structural 
changes. Thus, having in place adequate legislative structures to 
implement same is important. On the other side of the coin, the legislation 
would protect local companies from exploitation by large multinationals 
who may seek to dominate the market and leave no room for competition. 
This Chapter demonstrates development of a competition law 
regime in Botswana. It provides a detailed background showing the 
theoretical aspects of this development.  The background provided 
addresses the questions being raised herein and provides a foundational 
basis. It will therefore expound on the link between the development of 
the law and the operation of the Act so far as mergers are concerned.  
The Chapter will give reasons for engaging in the process and 
highlight policy considerations for drafting of the Act. It will demonstrate 
that the reasons for the introduction of competition legislation were 
largely economical and formulated on policies.  The shortcomings in the 
preparation and drafting stages which eventually had an effect on the 
functioning and regulation of mergers in Botswana will be evidenced. 
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There will be focus on whether the assistance provided was adequate for 
the functioning of mergers.  
Competition or Anti trust26 law has been defined in many contexts. 
But the principle purpose has been formulated around the structuring of 
the market for goods and services by the imposition of controls designed 
to promote competition within that market.27 The first piece of anti trust 
legislation was passed in Canada in 1889 and was known as the Act for 
the Prevention and Suppression of Combinations in Restraint of Trade. 
This Act was assented to in response of public concern over pricing 
practices of organized groups of companies known as combines.28 Thus, 
the passing of the Act was a way of regulating the functioning of the 
combines. Mergers and monopolizations were first introduced in 1910.29 
  In America it saw its advent as legislation enacted initially by the 
federal government and later by the individual state governments to 
regulate trade and commerce by preventing unlawful restraints, price 
fixing and monopolies to promote competition and encourage the 
production of quality good and services at the lowest prices. The primary 
goal was to safeguard public welfare by ensuring that consumer 
demands were met by the manufacture of goods and sale at a 
reasonable price.30 Over the years competition law moved to other parts 
of the world and has been largely based on the development in Canada 
and the United States.  
One of the main purposes of competition law has been alluded to 
as being the remedying of some of the situations in which the free market 
system breaks down.31 It follows therefore that competition law is greatly 
linked to economics or more specifically the functioning of the economy. 
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 This is the term used to refer to Competition law in the United States and will be used as a 
synonym herein. 
27
 Brassey (Note 1) p 1. 
28
 Ross T.W, ‘Introduction: The Evolution of Competition Law in Canada’, Faculty of Commerce and 
Business Administration, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada, V6T 1Z2 3. 
29
 Ibid at p5. 
30
 West’s Encyclopaedia of American Law available at 
http://iris.nyit.edu/~shartman/mba0101/trust.htm accessed on 4 June 2013 
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One author on the subject has elucidated that economics can be 
employed in two main ways in relation to competition law.32 First because 
competition law is aimed in part at remedying market failure, a general 
macro-economic argument can be made as to the existence of such 
market failure and the costs imposed by it. Secondly, micro-economic 
arguments are likely to be relied upon in individual cases to justify 
intervention or to defend a company’s position.  
This being said it is submitted that in promulgating or passing anti-
trust laws, a state must always be aware of the economics involved and 
be sure to include them in enacting such legislation. It has been 
submitted that developing countries deserve an antitrust law that fits the 
facts of their markets and responds to their condition and needs,33 and 
they deserve a law so designed and so characterized that their people 
will embrace it as sympathetic and legitimate rather than reject it as 
foreign. Thus the processes discussed in this chapter will be an indication 
of the extent to which these factors were considered. 
The formal introduction of competition law in Botswana 
demonstrates what was described by the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) as an example of an all-inclusive 
approach.34 And in being an all inclusive approach the expectation would 
be that all aspects of this particular field of law are catered for. The 
complete processes leading to promulgation of the Act are elucidated on 
below. 
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 Ibid at p7. 
33
 EM Fox ‘Economic Development Poverty and Antitrust: The Other Path’, South Western Journal 
of Law and Trade in the Americas 2007 126. 
34
 UN Conference on Trade and Development, Capacity-building on Competition Law and Policy for 












 2.2 INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL INFLUENCE 
 
International, regional and national activities for the development 
of the legislation occurred somewhat simultaneously. The path to 
development and drafting of a single statute in respect of competition law 
in Botswana can be vaguely traced as far back as the 1996 Singapore 
WTO Ministerial Conference.35 At this conference competition policy 
became one of the new issues on the WTO agenda. Four working groups 
were set up, and among the four, was the Trade and Competition 
Working Group.36 It was aimed at enhancing of Trade and Competition 
policies and laws. 
The UNCTAD in its Manual on the Formulation and Application of 
Competition Law37 notes objectives and benefits of competition law. The 
most widely stated objective of anti-trust law legislation is to improve 
economic efficiency and thus contribute to economic development.  
Three benefits are stated, the first is that this type of law puts pressure on 
firms to produce and distribute their products at the lowest possible cost. 
Secondly it benefits consumers by ensuring that prices are kept down 
and are reduced in step with any cost reductions. The last benefit is that it 
allows firms the opportunity to introduce new products or processes or 
enter new markets, thus contributing toward technological advance and 
higher quality goods and services.38  These are the static and efficiency 
gains that economists usually attribute to competition. 
An effective competition law properly implemented and enforced, 
is essential to the preservation of competition and the realisation of the 
benefits that can flow to developed and developing countries alike. This 
notwithstanding, the manual notes that even though a country has 
effective competition law legislation there will still be presence of 
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 Ibid 21 at p 2. 
36
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference of 1996 accessed 
on 13 June 2013. 
37
 2004 Edition.  
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limitations in its operation and application.39 The UNCTAD has made vast 
contributions and provision of assistance to developing countries in so far 
as developing cooperating competition policies is concerned. These 
contributions are evidenced for example by the drive on Botswana to 
engage in an economic mapping study to assess the state of the 
economy as preparation for implementing a competition policy and finally 
drafting an act.  
In 2000, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
assented to the SADC Protocol on Trade. There were five objectives set 
out in the protocol. The fourth objective read as follows: 
“4. To enhance the economic diversification and 
industrialisation of the region.” 
 With such an objective in place, the protocol clearly aimed at 
making provisions for ways of enhancing economies of member states. 
As a developing community, the regional organization admittedly aims to 
make positive improvements towards economic development. And as has 
been reiterated from the beginning of this paper, having in place a 
mechanism of regulating competition in an economy is key, especially for 
developing countries. Alas the protocol at Article 25 provides for a 
competition policy, reading as follows:  
“Member states shall implement measures within the 
community that prohibit unfair business practices and 
promote competition.”  
 This article therefore made it compulsory at regional level for all 
member states to have in place national competition laws. Member states 
with no competition laws would have to commence the processes of 
preparation geared at putting the legislation in place.  
 In 2002, member states of the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU) entered into an agreement in recognition that their previous 
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agreement concluded in 1969 no longer catered for the needs of the 
customs union in line with developments in the 21st century.40 This 
agreement was concluded bearing in mind the different levels of 
development of member states and the need for their integration in the 
global economy. Similarly to the SADC protocol, one of the objectives of 
the SACU Agreement was: 
“(e). to enhance economic development, diversification, 
industrialization and competitiveness of member states.” 
 Again likewise to the SADC Protocol, the SACU Agreement 
provided for a competition Policy. Article 40 of the agreement states as 
follows: 
“ 1. Member states shall agree that there shall be 
competition policies in each member state and 
2. Member states shall cooperate with each other with 
respect to enforcement of competition laws and 
regulations.” 
 Article 40 therefore aims to harmonize states in development of 
competition laws so that they may learn from and assist each other. Read 
together, the SADC Protocol and the SACU Agreement by their 
provisions mandating states that do not have competition policies, hard-
pressed them to start making headway into development of same. 
Although the economies of member states of these organizations are not 
generally on the same rank, at a regional level member states are able to 
assist one another in progression of drafting competition laws. 
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2.3 THE BOTSWANA PRIVATISATION POLICY  
 
In 2002, the Botswana Government published a Privatisation 
Policy. This policy defined privatisation as a process of transferring 
ownership of public enterprises to private owners.41 This process 
encompasses all the measures and policies aimed at strengthening the 
role of the private sector in the economy. It may be submitted at this point 
that having an anti-trust policy and legislation strengthens the aims of 
privatisation. Privatisation changes the distribution of power in a society, 
and by so doing it diminishes control of the economy by the state.42 As a 
result, public support has to be a major consideration in any privatisation 
programme.   
The reasons why a state would want to privatise its entities differ 
from country to country, however the main objectives are similar. These 
objectives include promoting competition; improving efficiency and 
increasing productivity in enterprises; increasing direct citizen 
participation in the ownership of assets; withdrawing from commercial 
activities which no longer need to be undertaken by the public sector; 
reducing the size of the public sector and relieving the financial and 
administrative burden of the government in undertaking and maintaining 
a constantly expanding network of services and investments in 
infrastructure.  In promoting competition, it will be necessary to regulate 
and ensure that it is fair.43  
Paragraph 63 of the Privatisation Policy provides for legal and 
regulatory reform. For privatisation to succeed the legislative, regulatory 
and policy environment should not impede the application of commercial 
principles. It goes on to connote that privatisation requires 
complementary measures to remove beauracratic restrictions that 
prevent all firms from operating effectively and efficiently. This being said, 
the Privatisation Policy observes the need for a competition law. It 
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 Republic of Botswana, ‘Privatisation Policy for Botswana, Government Paper No. 1 of 2000’, 
















explains that competition is fundamental if firms are to court the market 
for profits and not the government for favours. Further provision is made 
to the effect that to act as an aid to the success of privatisation, a 
competition law will have to be enacted clearly delineating the powers, 
right and responsibilities of competitive entities.44  
In continuation, submission is made that public policy issues 
involving anti-competitive practices must be considered in relation to a 
privatisation process. The reason given for this is that once a public 
enterprise has been privatised, its behaviour as well as the behaviour of 
other private sector businesses in relation to mergers and acquisitions 
needs to be within the regulatory framework addressing critical issues in 
this area.45 Therefore, the Policy concludes that measures and 
institutions to regulate anti-competitive behaviour of firms would have to 
be put in place. 
The Privatisation Policy concludes by indicating the need to enact 
a competition law providing for the establishment of a multi-product 
regulatory authority and specifying its functions. This Policy put the 
government in a position of knowledge in terms of what would be 
essential in drafting an act that complemented privatisation.46   
It is opined that prior to promulgating a competition act, a policy is 
necessary for purposes of placing a government in a better position with 
regards to elements that need to be included in the act. In this respect 
provisions for mergers would have to be drafted taking into consideration 
private stakeholders and their contributions towards the functioning of 
competition law, as well as to their contribution toward economic growth, 
thus fulfilling objectives of the policy. The policy acted as a stepping 
stone to the development of an act and put into consideration some 
aspects of what would have to be included in legislation.  
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2.4 THE ECONOMIC MAPPING FOR BOTSWANA  
In 2002 the Botswana Institute for Development and Policy 
Analysis (BIDPA)47 submitted a final report on the Economic Mapping 
Study for Botswana (the Report). This report was submitted to the 
Ministry of Trade Industry Wildlife and Tourism48 and was prepared in 
response to an invite by UNCTAD and the Ministry to map out the 
economic structure of Botswana in order to identify the key constraints on 
competition in all sectors of the economy.49 BIDPA engaged in research 
on the state of the economy and more importantly the need for 
development of a competition law framework.  
The preparation of the Report was the first step within the 
jurisdiction towards the actual drafting of the Competition Act. The Report 
explicitly states that it is clear that in drafting good quality competition 
legislation; there should be an understanding of the market conditions 
prevailing in the economy.50 Its main objective was to provide a detailed 
analysis of the market for key industries in an attempt to identify the basic 
conditions and characteristics of the market for the various industries. It is 
imperative that a competition policy be devised so as to be able to 
implement the privatisation policy.51 This is evidence that the conclusions 
reached in the Privatisation Policy held water in respect of development 
of a competition framework in Botswana. 
At the beginning of this chapter, the relationship between 
competition and the economy was enunciated. This relationship has also 
been alluded to in the Report. It postulates that most economists agree 
that there is a positive relationship between competition and economic 
growth. The functioning of the two was assessed theoretically and 
practically. From a theoretic point of view competition expels inefficient 
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enterprises from the market; it helps remaining enterprises increase their 
efficiency and competitiveness. The possible and expected result of this 
would be economic growth. Practically, industries facing vigorous 
competition in the domestic market are more successful than those 
protected by regulations.   
 According to the Report, the 1990’s were characterized by a rise in 
globalization and mergers between many large international entities. This 
growth made it difficult for developing countries such as Botswana to hide 
behind protective walls of import tariffs and other barriers to foreign 
competition, or to stop anti-competitive behaviour of local subsidiaries of 
merging large multinational corporations. Thus making it necessary to 
have an own internal mechanism of regulating competition in line with 
international needs.52 
The Report at paragraph 24 went on further to stipulate that more 
firms and more countries operate in a greater number of markets, thus 
increasing the number of markets and competition nationally and 
internationally. This has made competition a matter of prime concern of 
both governments and firms. A clear reflection of a country’s 
competitiveness is how much foreign investment it attracts. Aside from its 
advantages, globalisation brings about a lot of challenges. These 
challenges will of course differ from country to country. A clear 
understanding of these complexities would be helpful in formulating 
practical policies to address any issues arising in a quest to promote 
growth and prosperity.53  
Firms within an economy should be geared towards responding 
quickly to the changing market needs and conditions. This is why it is 
then necessary that there be competent institutions in place for policy 
making, creating and enforcing legal and regulatory systems and dealing 
with anti-competitive business practices.54 The Report concluded that 
Botswana must adapt its economic structure, legal and regulatory 
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environment and production and marketing mechanisms in order to 
effectively participate in the mainstream of international trade and 
investment.55 These considerations it is submitted would surely improve 
the competitiveness of Tswana firms internationally. 
 The Report further pointed out that having in place a competition 
framework is a way of diversifying the economy. The need to diversify the 
Botswana economy has been reflected in National Development  Plans 7 
and 8 56 as well as in Vision 2016.57 The private sector has to play an 
increasing role in development; and in order for it to thrive, competition 
has to be promoted and encouraged. The Report at paragraph 39 alluded  
that a relatively un-diversified economy typically has difficulty adjusting to 
external shocks such as a downturn in the diamond market which is 
Botswana’s livelihood, say for example in the event f another global 
economic recession. More diversified economies were noted to be 
generally better able to respond and adjust to such shocks. According to 
the Report increasing diversification of the Botswana economy would 
involve more competition among all economic agents, especially by 
giving consumers, resource suppliers and producers more choices and 
better opportunities.58 
The government has in place citizen empowerment entities such 
as the Citizen Entrepreneurial Development Agency (CEDA). This entity 
was established to provide financial and technical support for business 
development in a view to promote viable and sustainable citizen owned 
businesses.  The Report notes that because most citizen empowered 
companies will have little capital and expertise, government assistance 
will be necessary.59 It suggests mechanisms that could be used to 
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improve citizen economic empowerment and as a result have positive 
implications on competition.60  
These suggested methods include preferential procurement 
policies and licence allocation and privatization. It was found that the 
increased participation of citizens in key sectors of the economy provides 
a sense of economic and social security and may attract foreign 
investment. Therefore an effective citizen empowerment programme can 
create a competitive economic environment that will reduce the role of 
government in key sectors of the economy. CEDA acts as such a citizen 
empowerment programme. As more and more Batswana go into 
business through this initiative, there arises the possibility that they will 
seek to expand and merger with other businesses locally, or be part of 
large multinationals. It is submitted that laws aimed at regulating mergers 
and acquisitions, will protect citizens from the possible adverse effect of 
large multinationals that they merge with. 
The Report includes a discussion on Competition Law and Policy. 
Therein it broadly defines competition policy as meaning a full range of 
measures that may be used to promote a competitive market structure 
and behaviour in an economy, and this includes competition law dealing 
with anti-competitive practices of enterprises. Narrowly, it refers to the set 
of laws and policies adopted by a country to prevent or remedy restrictive 
business practices by both private and public enterprises.61 
A country’s competition policy has to first of all include policies that 
enhance competition in local and national markets. Secondly it should 
include a competition law designed to prevent anti-competitive business 
practices by firms and unnecessary government intervention in the 
market place.62 As such a policy should be peculiar and distinct to a 
particular economy to ensure that it fully serves its purpose. This meant 
that a competition law or policy drafted would have to be fitting for the 
local market and the needs of the market sufficiently. 
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 At the time of presentation of the Report, the interface between 
trade and competition policy had intensified.63 The main reason for this 
being the growing integration of the world economy, which implied that 
anti-competitive business practices increasingly have trans-border 
dimensions.64 Additionally with the expansion of trade and investment, 
foreign countries were seen to be concerned with whether national 
competition laws are adequate to deal with possible anti-competitive 
practices by domestic companies.65 It became a concern for developing 
countries which had not yet developed competition laws that they would 
not be able to address possible abuse of market power in their 
economies. It is hereby submitted that a competition law would have to 
provide for cross-border mergers bearing in mind trans-border and cross 
border transactions. In addition a Competition law for Botswana would 
have to ensure that it fulfils this and in drafting a competition act, 
international standards would have to be met. 
 Firms compete in a market place for consumers’ money; 
consumers should therefore get value for their money.66 A competition 
policy should therefore protect consumers from the power of monopolies 
and collusive behaviour of firms working together to strip the consumer 
from its power to choose from alternative products.67 Merger regulation 
should be drafted bearing this in mind. Provisions would have to consider 
issues of public interest, as that extends to the effect that regulation has 
on consumers as beneficiaries of the process. These provisions would 
have to enhance public confidence in the law. 
 Competition Policy was levelled against development.68 A 
developing country should have a competition policy designed to take 
appropriate account of its level of economic development and the long 
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term objective of sustained economic growth.69 The reasons for this are 
partly because of the potential effects of international merger movement 
and also because of privatisation.  
Developing countries are not necessarily at the same level of 
development, some are more industrialized than others and have higher 
institutional capabilities, and sight of this should not be lost. It was also 
enunciated that competition policies adopted in more developed countries 
like the USA may not be appropriate for a country like Botswana.70 It is 
however submitted, notwithstanding this factor, the competition policies of 
the more developed world may be used as an aid for development of 
competition policies in the developing world. Further, due to economic 
stance and history, a developing country should be guided by different 
principles in promulgation of competition laws from those of the more 
developed world. Care and precision as to the state of the economy 
should be a factor that sticks out in drafting of competition legislation. 
2.5 THE COMPETITION POLICY FOR BOTSWANA 
 
 The Ministry on the recommendations made in the Report, drafted 
a Competition Policy for Botswana (the Policy). The Policy was published 
by the Botswana government in July 2005.  The rationale for the Policy 
was based on the need to maximise the benefits of trade and investment 
liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation and to protect the benefits 
generated by competition from erosion by anticompetitive practices in an 
unregulated environment.71  
 The Policy provides a framework to prevent and redress anti-
competitive practices and conduct by firms.72 It was necessary to have 
one because it would provide the best means of ensuring that the 
economy’s resources are put to their most efficient use by encouraging 
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enterprise efficiency and widening choice.73 The Policy sets out a broad 
framework with which government will respond to anti-competitive 
challenges in the market place and ensure that firms operating in various 
sectors of the economy adhere to policy and regulatory requirements.74 
By so doing the government would have to in drafting of legislation, 
consider all aspects of the economy and market which would be affected 
by the legislation and ensure that they are well provided for.  
 Three factors with immense bearing need to be considered from 
the outset.75 These are efficiency, competitiveness and consumer 
welfare. Efficiency is indispensable to the ability of any economy to attract 
investment flows from both international and domestic sources. 
Competitiveness is a critical success factor in the ability of any economy 
to effectively compete for the attraction of investment flows, especially 
foreign direct investment. The Policy recognizes the important role of 
competiveness as underpinning continued growth and sustainability of 
the economy at both micro and macro levels.76 Consumer welfare is 
important because it serves as a public interest phenomenon 
encompassing choices and rights of consumers.77 It is submitted that 
these factors are important for the functioning of merger regulation, 
especially where public interest issues arise as it forms an integral part of 
merger regulation. 
 Guiding principles78 provide a foundation on which a competition 
law must be drafted and gives a guide on what ought to be included and 
given precedence. It is important not to be too over swayed by these 
guiding principles in drafting of competition legislation, they should be 
considered but not forgetting the economic and social situation in a 
country as well as resources for implementation. Bearing this in mind, 
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other laws and administrative policies which may have been deterrents to 
free competition would have to be amended accordingly. 
 The Policy set out strategic policy considerations which 
government deemed to be necessary,79 and only those relevant to this 
paper will be briefly discussed below. The first one was the establishment 
of a Competition Authority to regulate the Policy and related legislation. 
The importance of this in relation to mergers is that the Authority would 
act as a body ensuring that regulation of mergers best serves interests of 
the country as well as those of competing firms.  Secondly, the Policy 
sought to ensure the consistency of the other policy considerations.  
Public awareness and support for competition enforcement as well 
as the need for provision for mergers and acquisitions were encapsulated 
in the Policy. This would be done so as to safeguard competition in the 
market place by reviewing mergers and acquisitions.80  The Policy 
emphasizes the need for a regulatory framework.81 Therein it sets out 
that in order to ensure compliance with and adherence to locally and 
internationally acceptable anticompetitive business behaviour and 
conduct, the government will formulate a Competition Act, which will 
regulate the market place. 
  Paragraph 10 provides for institutional arrangements which would 
be necessary for the formulation, review and monitoring of the 
competition policy. The responsibility of having in place institutional 
arrangements and of drafting legislation was placed with the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry and a Competition Authority to be established would 
be responsible for implementation of the Policy and the Competition Act.   
Success of the Policy was placed on action by government.82 The 
government would have to first of all establish an independent 
Competition Authority which would successfully deal with and regulate 
mergers. Secondly it would have to ensure compliance of enforcement of 
                                                          
79
 Note 71 para 8. 
80
 Note 71 para 8.1 (f). 
81
Note 71 para 9. 
82












the rules of fair play and lastly maintain an effective and equitable 
balance between the interests of business and those of the public. It is 
submitted that this meant government would have to ensure that a 
Competition Act is drafted to the satisfaction and needs of the Policy as 
well as all other policies that preceded it. This action will be addressed in 
the next part of this chapter.  
 It is submitted with due respect that the Policy did not really 
highlight any new factors from those set out in the economic mapping 
study and appears to have mostly contained a summary of what was in 
the economic mapping. It was a continuation and implementation of 
recommendations made in the Report. The Policy had more thorough 
provisions for the institutional framework. They both set out the structural 
and other considerations and structures that necessary in establishing an 
effective competition regime. 
2.6 THE BOTSWANA COMPETITION ACT OF 2009 
 
  In April 2013 the Director of Legal and Enforcement of the 
Competition Authority made a presentation to the breakout session of the 
International Competition Network (ICN) Unilateral Conduct Working 
Group.  He submitted that the Botswana Competition Act is a hybrid of 
Competition law of provisions of Zambia, South Africa, England, Mauritius 
and Australia.83  Consultations also took place with the Swedish, Swiss 
and Chinese Governments.84  It is submitted that although this was 
helpful to the passing of the Act, it caused inherent problems not only in 
respect of the regulation of mergers but also the Act as a whole. In 
addition to all the policy considerations set out in the preceding parts of 
this chapter, there was a lot more that went into the actual drafting of the 
Act. The Botswana Government engaged in a lot of consultation in 
drafting of the Act and did so with assistance and guidance from the 
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UNCTAD.  Consultations and workshops geared at educating and 
preparing the drafters of the Act for same were conducted.85  
 The UNCTAD has published documentation in respect of the 
assistance to developing countries for drafting of competition legislation. 
Provision of this assistance was divided into capacity building activities86 
and technical assistance activities.87 These were meant to provide 
understanding of the issues involved in formulation and enforcement, 
which is imparted to participating officials and experts from developing 
countries.88 It is submitted here that the approach of the UNCTAD sought 
to be more practical in seeking to ensure that all policy considerations 
and objectives are fulfilled. This was now a move away from all the 
theoretical aspects that were formulated before actual drafting took place. 
It was a step in the right direction. 
 The UNCTAD emphasizes the importance of the relationship 
between competition policy and other development policies.89 In 2006, 
assistance was provided to the Botswana Government with the aim of 
creating an understanding of the interface between competition law and 
policy and other government policies including privatisation, regulatory 
reforms, trade liberalization, investment regimes and the need to address 
poverty reduction concerns.90 Capacity-building was also provided for the 
formulation of national competition laws and it drew attention to the need 
to ensure coherence between the creation of a competition culture 
pursued by the Government.91 Additionally it underscored the importance 
of putting in place well functioning commercial courts and mechanisms 
for judicial review for the effective enforcement of competition law. This 
preparation in the context of Botswana is welcome. The need for 
commercial courts would however not fit into the Botswana judicial 
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system which does not have a vast variety of specialised courts; it is 
limited to industrial labour courts and livestock theft courts. This 
notwithstanding setting up of courts specialised in this area will enhance 
the nature of the Botswana judicial system. 
 Two consultative meetings were held in 2006 between officials 
from the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Attorney General’s office and 
other stakeholders to discuss the draft Competition Bill and 
corresponding application guidelines.92 It is submitted that this sought to 
assess the status of the drafting process as well as provisions of the Act 
and how the Regulations would be related to them. This was beneficial in 
the sense that it ensured that preparations were proceeding accordingly.  
 In the drafting stages, and as a further way of providing 
assistance, the UNCTAD organised study tours for officials from the 
Ministry of Trade and the Attorneys General’s office to the Swedish and 
Swiss competition authorities.93 The purpose of these tours was to 
improve the understanding on Botswana’s officials in the different aspects 
of the functioning of a competition authority namely; its structure, 
functions and competencies as well as the roles that these authorities 
play in promoting consumer welfare and competitive markets. These 
were not provided for the benefit of actual personnel that would be later 
employed in the Competition Authority. This was meant to be of an 
advantage; however it was a potential problem for the Competition 
Authority which would later be established. The personnel employed 
would either have to possess previous experience in the functioning of a 
competition authority or similar institution, or conversely have to start 
from scratch in educating themselves on the practical functioning of a 
competition authority. If employees are not aware of the functions of a 
competition authority then training courses would have to be organized 
for them. This is something which could have been avoided by providing 
the training before the Authority began its official operation.  This could in 
turn have adverse consequences resulting from a reverse functioning. 
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The effectiveness of the performance of the competition authority would 
be wanting in that public trust would be likely to be lessened due to lack 
of skilled officials as their ability to handle issues would be in doubt.  
 As mergers are specialised there would be a need to have 
specialised courts for this purpose.94 This was levelled against the fact 
that mergers need to be decided timeously and in the event that there are 
appeals to the High Court,95 the High Court may not be able to dispense 
with the decisions expeditiously due to existing backlog. The Act was 
drafted with a view to have independence in decision making on matters 
before the Competition Authority. The UNCTAD as part of its assistance 
to developing countries provided training of competition case handlers.96 
However this assistance was not extended to Botswana. It is submitted 
that there ought to have been some sort of training provided to 
employees of the Authority once it started functioning and to judicial 
officers in respect of the processes and in particular the challenges 
associated with deciding of whether a merger should be effected or not, 
as well as on appeals relating to mergers.  
 In 2009 the Botswana government passed the Competition Act.97 
The Act applies to all economic activity within, or having effect within 
Botswana.98 Operation of the Act was not effected all at once. Parts I to 
IV became operative first, on 9 July 2010. Under Part II of the Act the 
Competition Authority is established99 as a body corporate capable of 
suing and being sued. The responsibility of the Authority is to prevent and 
redress anti-competitive practices in the economy and remove 
constraints on the free play of competition in the market.100 The Act also 
sets out specific responsibilities of the Authority and these include 
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regulating the merging of enterprises101 and prohibiting or referring of 
mergers which it receives notification of under Part X.102 The Authority is 
also responsible for referring matters investigated under the Act to the 
Commission,103 prosecute before the Commission, matters referred to the 
Commission104  and deal with any matter referred to it by the Commission 
under the Act105. 
 Section 9 of the Act establishes the Competition Commission. It is 
the governing body of the Authority.  The Competition Authority and the 
Competition Commission are closely linked in merger regulation and 
personnel. The shortcomings of the institutional structure of the 
Competition Authority and the Competition Commission will be discussed 
in Chapter 3. Part X of the Act provides for the control of mergers and the 
next chapter will assess issues in respect of such control.  
2.7 CONCLUSION  
 
The development canvassed above demonstrates that there was a 
lot of arrangement and implementation of policies seeking to ensure that 
Botswana is aware of the imperative considerations necessary for 
implementation of a competition law. Botswana felt the need to 
promulgate competition law following pressure from international and 
regional levels. Preparation at national level ensured that most of the 
necessary steps involved in drafting of legislation were engaged in. The 
state of the economy was observed and the necessary institutional 
frameworks that had to be set up were identified.  
  Thus far, this paper has addressed all the theoretical aspects of 
the competition framework in Botswana. The link between the theoretical 
considerations and the actual drafting of the Act were elaborated upon.  It 
is commendable that Botswana engaged in a thorough process for 
promulgating competition legislation. However as is often the case, when 
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drafting a totally new type of legislation, there are anomalies in the 
legislation and these in turn affect the operation and functioning of 
mergers. The current flaws in the Act affecting merger regulation are a 
result of the preparation and drafting stages. Chapter 3 will look directly 
into whether the framework and institutions created do in fact perform 
their necessary function in so far as regulation of mergers in concerned 
and assess whether the policy considerations which influenced drafting of 































Mergers and their regulation form an integral part of antitrust law in 
every jurisdiction. In broad terms in a merger or an amalgamation, the 
assets and liabilities of two or more companies are pooled into a single 
company which may be either of the combining companies or a newly 
formed company.106  Mergers arise by way of agreement between 
parties, the result being that one entity assumes control over the other. 
There are three different categories of mergers - horizontal, vertical and 
conglomerate, attracting decreasing levels of concern in the order 
stated.107  
A horizontal merger is between two firms selling identical or similar 
products in the same geographic area. It eliminates competition between 
the two firms.108 A vertical merger entails a combination of the activities of 
parties in a vertical relationship such as between a manufacturer and its 
distributor.109 Conglomerate mergers generally cover all other types of 
mergers where the parties have no apparent economic relationship.110 
The interpretation section of the Act only defines horizontal and vertical 
mergers. 
Through the Competition Act (Specified Parts Commencement 
Date) Order 2011,111 Parts V to XII of the Competition Act commenced 
function. The whole Act was now in force and the Competition Authority 
started operating. Part X of the Act provides for Control of Mergers. The 
reasons for merger control are vast. However for the most part they are 
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controlled because competition authorities are concerned with just one 
issue, namely the assessment of the competitive effects of mergers112 
This chapter discusses the pertinent issues arising so far as 
merger control in Botswana is concerned. It concerns itself with the 
practical aspects of merger control and regulation.  Focus in this chapter 
will be on the control of mergers  under Part X of the Botswana 
Competition Act; the link between mergers in the Companies Act113; the 
issue of merger thresholds; structural shortcomings of the competition 
authority and competition commission and decided mergers levelled 
against the assessment criteria used. Discussion of these issues will 
explore how same has had or will be likely to have practical implications 
on merger regulation which derives basis and existence from the policy 
considerations and the process of drafting.  
3.2 CONTROL OF MERGERS UNDER PART X OF THE BOTSWANA 
COMPETITION ACT 
 
The Act provides that a merger occurs when one or more 
enterprises directly or indirectly acquires or establishes direct or indirect 
control over the whole or part of the business of another enterprise.114 
This essentially means that one business takes over another and the two 
operate as one. This acquisition of control over the whole or part of 
another enterpr se may be achieved in any manner, including the 
purchase or lease of shares, an interest, or assets of the other enterprise 
in question;115 or amalgamation or other combination with that 
enterprise.116 The Act only gives the two preceding descriptions, however 
it does not restrict a merger to only these because it uses the word 
‘including’. The forms for merger filing,117 as read in the Regulations,118 
require transaction information. Indication of what the transaction involves 
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is limited to foreign direct investment, a management buy out or a buy 
back of shares. The Act and the Regulations both have limits in 
specifications of transactions which qualify as notifiable mergers. The 
wording of the Act demonstrates that these are not the limits for types of 
transactions which may be deemed to constituted mergers.  These 
provisions are a guide of what constitutes a merger.  
Before enterprises proposing to merge can do so, they have to 
notify the Authority of their intention in the prescribed manner.119 Upon 
receipt of a merger notification, the Authority shall publish details of the 
notification in local newspapers.120 Where the Authority requires further 
information to that provided in the notification, it shall request same within 
30 days of receipt of the notification. When this occurs publication of the 
notification will be delayed until the requested information is received.121 
The Authority shall consider and make a determination of a notified 
merger within 30 days of receipt of the notification122 and where further 
information was requested the determin tion shall be made within 30 
days after receipt of the additional information.123 In addition the Authority 
is given the liberty to extend the determination of a merger and shall give 
the enterprises involved notice of same.124 These are commendable and 
clear provisions. The only contention is that the determination period is 
rather short for a new competition authority with modest expertise. 
  Examination of the merger filing forms establishes that they use 
plain language, therefore filling them in presents no difficulty. These 
forms are based on provisions in the regulations, and they bring out 
questions on issues that are not provided for in the Act. For example, 
failing firm defence is addressed in the forms, but its meaning and 
function is not set out in the Act. This it is submitted, has the potential of 
creating difficulties practically when practitioners have to fill out these 
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forms because there are no corresponding provisions for failing firms in 
the legislation.  
The failing firm defence is invoked where parties demonstrate that 
in the absence of the acquisition the target firm would not have remained 
a competitor because it has financial difficulties or is on the verge of 
insolvency.125 A merger notice shall be accompanied by a merger fee of 
0.01 percent of the merging enterprises’ combined turnover in Botswana, 
whichever is higher.126 This fee is not applicable to the turnover or assets 
of an enterprise which is party to a merger if the enterprise has been 
bankrupt for at least three consecutive financial years127 or where the 
assets of the company are being disposed of following a liquidation 
process.128 Moreover, the Form J under the heading Transaction 
Information requires that where an enterprise relies n the ‘failing 
enterprise defence’129 information relating to same should be submitted 
with the filing notice. This is evidence of inclusion of the failing firm 
defence in the Regulations, whereas same does not appear in the Act. 
The Act should be amended to provide for these principles so as to 
ensure analogous purpose of the Act and the Regulations.   
Section 57 provides that in considering a notified merger, the 
Authority may refer the notification of the proposed merger to an 
inspector for an investigation and report. The criteria to be used are 
specified in section 59 and will be dealt with later on in this chapter. The 
interpretation section of the Act does not define what an inspector is nor 
does it set out any qualifications that such a person should possess.  The 
inspector, it is provided, shall investigate the proposal and furnish the 
Authority with a report on the investigation.130 
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Section 8 provides for appointment of employees. This is done by 
the Commission on the recommendation of the Executive Secretary.131 
The Executive Secretary is given powers to appoint full time or part time 
inspectors from among employees of the Authority or any other person 
considered suitable.132 The Executive Secretary shall also determine the 
conditions of service and remuneration of an inspector who is not in the 
full time service of the Authority. The Regulations also do not provide for 
the qualifications of an inspector. They only provide for the identification 
card which an inspector must possess when entering the premises of an 
enterprise to conduct an inspection.133 This omission in respect of the 
office of inspector creates a lacuna which may affect effectiveness in 
operation of the merger regulation.  
It is submitted that the role of an inspector is a very sensitive one 
in merger control. The qualification and role of an inspector should 
therefore be provided for in a broader and more detailed manner. It is 
commendable that inspectors may be appointed on a part time basis due 
to the fact that there will be differing and diverse enterprises in some 
cases requiring a person of a certain type of skill and qualification to 
conduct an inspection. A certificate of inspection alone does not 
guarantee absence of hostility to enter upon premises for purposes of 
inspection.  
Preparation and drafting of the Act was dominated by continuous 
declarations that a competition act would have to meet international 
standards for it to be attractive to large international companies and 
therefore boost confidence in a country. One such way of boosting 
international confidence it is submitted, would be by having adequate 
provision for cross border mergers. The Act is not clear as to the aspect 
of cross border notification. It does not specify what is to happen where 
the Act is applicable to foreign mergers. What is to happen in situations 
where parties to a merger are not in Botswana, but have subsidiaries in 
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Botswana that would be indirectly acquired as a result of the merger? On 
interpretation of the Act it is submitted that it would be applicable and 
therefore a submission would have to be made with the Competition 
Authority. This is evidenced by section 3 of the Act which provides for 
application. The section stipulates that the Act applies to all economic 
activity within, or having effect within the Botswana.134  
The Act provides that subject to the protection of confidential 
information, the Authority shall publish details of notification.135 The 
extent of the details to be published in a notification is not clear. The 
Authority publishes information by stating the name of the entities 
involved and going further to state the nature of the proposed transaction 
as well as what it will entail.136  Since the extent of confidentiality is not 
provided for, interested parties may wish to have more information or the 
parties themselves may feel that some of the information is confidential 
for their purposes and do not wish for it to be disclosed. The parties may 
rely on section 37 which entitles an enterprise to refuse to enclose or 
produce information or a document on the grounds of legal privilege 
indicating that the document is inter alia of economic value and 
constitutes confidential information by not providing such information for 
fear that it will be published. Confidential information is not defined in the 
Act, and this is an omission. However, notwithstanding this omission, 
given that confidential information is fact based and can only be 
determined with reference to the particular facts of each case, the lack of 
a definition may be beneficial.  
Regulations may be prescribed for categories of transactions 
which are exempt from merger control.137 This will be done by reference 
to the commercial or industrial sector involved, the nature of the activities 
in which the enterprises are involved or some aspect of general public 
interest. Thus far, no regulations have been passed to this effect. 
Nonetheless, existence of a provision of the calibre is laudable.  
                                                          
134
 Section 3 (1). 
135
 Section 56 (2). 
136
 This is done pursuant to Section 56 (1). 
137












As a safeguard, mergers implemented in contravention the Act are 
catered for.138 This section is invoked where the Authority has reasonable 
suspicion that a merger is being, or has been, implemented in 
contravention of Part X139 of the Act. The parties will be required to 
submit information regarding the suspected merger140  or the Authority 
will restrain them from implementing the merger or take steps such as 
disposal of assets that would pre-empt the taking of remedial action 
designed to restore the conditions of competition existing prior to the 
merger.141  
The Authority may engage in an investigation to determine that a 
merger has been implemented in contravention of the Act. Where it is 
satisfied that this has transpired, it may give direction to the enterprises 
involved as follows; not to implement the merger,142 to sell or dispose of 
in any other specified manner, any shares, interest or other assets it has 
acquired pursuant to the merger,143 to terminate any agreements or 
provisions of an agreement to which the merger was subject,144 and to 
take such further measures as may be necessary to restore the 
conditions of competition existing prior to the merger. This is a protection 
of the market from unfair competition. It is very impressive that provisions 
in respect of merger control go as far as making a provision such as this.    
3.3 THE LINK BETWEEN MERGERS IN THE COMPANIES ACT AND IN 
THE COMPETITION ACT 
 
Part XIV of the Companies Act145 provides for amalgamations. The 
definition of amalgamation is synonymous with that of a merger, therefore 
an amalgamation may be said to be a form of merger. Two or more 
companies may amalgamate, and continue as one company, which may 
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be one of the amalgamating companies or may be a new company.146 
The provisions and requirements for amalgamations are not stringent. 
For an amalgamation to succeed in terms of the Companies Act there 
has to be an amalgamation proposal. This proposal has to contain inter 
alia the following information147, name of the amalgamated company; the 
registered office of the amalgamated company; full names and residential 
addresses or addresses of directors or the company secretary; the share 
structure of the amalgamated company; the manner in which the shares 
of each amalgamating company will be converted into the shares of the 
amalgamated company.   
The amalgamation proposal is to be approved by the board of 
directors by way of resolution.148 It will resolve that in its opinion the 
amalgamation is in the best interests of the company and that it is 
satisfied on reasonable grounds that the company will immediately after 
the amalgamation becomes effective satisfy the solvency test. The 
amalgamation proposal has to be registered with the office of the 
Registrar of Companies which examines the proposal to satisfy itself that 
all requirements have been met.149 If all requirements are met then an 
amalgamation certificate will be issued.150  
Under the Companies Act, final say as to whether companies may 
merge or amalgamate lies with the company itself, that is, with the Board 
of Directors. This may be contrasted with the situation under the South 
African Companies Act which goes further to require that for a merger to 
succeed there has to be compliance with the necessary requirements 
under competition law.151 This allows for stricter regulation of the process 
and also provides a link between different pieces of legislation, whose 
provision seek to achieve a similar purpose. This is absent in the case of 
Botswana. Despite this, where an amalgamation meets the criteria for a 
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merger under the Act then it will apply. The link between the provisions in 
these acts demonstrates that mergers do not operate in isolation to other 
legislation 
3.4 THE ISSUE OF MERGER THRESHOLD 
From the wording of the Act, not all mergers are subject to control. 
For a merger to be subject to the approval of the Authority a certain 
threshold has to be met. This is provided for under section 54 of the 
Competition Act as follows: 
“54. A proposed merger is subject to control in terms of this 
Act if - 
(a) the turnover in Botswana of the enterprise or 
enterprises being taken over exceeds an amount prescribed 
by the Minister in consultation with the Commission; 
(b) the assets in Botswana of the enterprise or 
enterprises being taken over have a value prescribed by the 
Minister in consultation with Commission (sic); or 
(c) The enterprise would, following implementation of 
the merger supply or acquire a percentage determined by 
the Commission, of a particular description of goods or 
services in Botswana.”  
Regulation 20152 provides for merger threshold amounts thus: 
“20. A proposed merger is subject to control in terms of the 
Act if - 
(a) the combined annual turnover in Botswana of the 
merging enterprises exceeds 10 000 000; or 
(b) the combined assets in Botswana of the merging 
enterprises exceeds P 10 000 000; or 
(c) The enterprises concerned would, following 
implementation of the merger, supply or acquire at least 20 
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percent of a particular description of goods or services in 
Botswana.” 
There is an inconsistency between the provisions of the Act and 
those in the Regulations. Based on section 54 (a), the Regulations should 
provide for a threshold amount that will be the limit of the turnover in 
Botswana of the enterprise or enterprises being taken over. If the 
prescribed amount is less than what the enterprise being taken over in 
Botswana makes, the merger will be controlled. Therefore, as an 
example, if the threshold is P 10 000-00 and the enterprise makes a 
turnover of P 20 000-00 then the merger will be controlled. If the 
enterprise makes less, the merger will not be controlled. Going by what 
Regulation 20 (a) provides, the Act should have provided that a merger 
will be notifiable first of all where the combined annual turnover in 
Botswana exceeds an amount prescribed or set by the Minister. The 
provisions of the Act and those of the Regulations as quoted above are at 
parallels in that they cannot be reconciled.  
In terms of section 54 (b), the Regulations should provide a 
threshold amount of the value of assets of the enterprise being taken 
over. If the amount is more then the prescribed value, the merger will 
controlled and if it is not, then the reverse will suffice.  The Regulations 
should accordingly have required the Act to provide that where the 
combined assets in Botswana of the merging parties exceeds a 
prescribed amount then there will be notification of the merger. Again the 
same argument as in the preceding paragraph suffices because neither 
provision intertwines with the other. 
  According to section 54 (c), a threshold percentage provided 
should upon implementation of the merger cause the concerned 
enterprises to supply or acquire a percentage of a particular description 
of goods. And similarly regulation 20 (c) provides that where following 
implementation of the merger, the enterprises concerned would supply or 












services in Botswana, then the merger will be notifiable. Here there exists 
a proper co-relation between the Act and the Regulations.  
The Act in terms of section 54 (a) and (b) therefore considers the 
target or target enterprises as the merger threshold determination. On the 
other hand, regulation 20 (a) and (b) consider the combined target and 
acquiring enterprises values. There is an anomaly here. The two have to 
be at par with one another and this is absent. 
The Interpretation Act153 provides for the interpretation of the 
Constitution and other enactments in Botswana. This act provides that an 
instrument shall be construed subject to this act154 and further that 
subject to sub section (1) this act and the instrument shall be construed 
as one.155 As further authority, in the case of Maauwe and Another v The 
Attorney General156 the court held that where an instrument is 
inconsistent with the principal legislation then that instrument is ultra vires 
the principal legislation and will be deemed to be of no force and effect.157 
As a result, with respect to the inconsistency between section 54 and 
regulation 20 of the Act, the provisions of the Act will take precedence.  
Another interesting aspect of merger threshold provisions is the 
valuation of the turnover or assets of the target enterprise in determining 
merger threshold. The Act makes it clear that all the assets or the annual 
turnover of the target enterprise are considered in the merger threshold. 
However in other jurisdictions such as South Africa the limits are based 
only on the value of the assets being transferred.158 Parties to a merger 
may mistakenly assume that it is the transferred assets or business that 
is used to consider the merger threshold and not the entire assets or 
turnover of the target enterprise. It is submitted that it is possible for 
enterprises to not understand why a transaction becomes notifiable in 
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instances where they sell a small amount of its assets leaving out the 
bulk of its assets which have more value. 
There exists a clear drafting error which needs to be corrected 
going forward. The regulations should either be amended to be 
consistent with the Act or vice versa for a regularised threshold 
determination to operate. Even though in law it is clear that principal 
legislation takes precedence over statutory instruments, this is not always 
clear to the layman. Continued existence of this inconsistency is likely to 
cause confusion for entities when determining the threshold amount to be 
paid, they may go for the threshold provided in the Regulations which is 
wrong. This will in turn cause problems for the Authority which will have 
to return amounts paid for being incorrect. Rectification of this drafting 
error will benefit both the Authority and its customers. As has been 
illustrated, having in place an anti-trust act makes a country attractive 
globally for investment, and since thresholds are as important aspect of 
merger regulation there should be no uncertainty or anomalies so far as 
provision for them is concerned. 
3.5 INSTITUTIONAL SHORTCOMINGS OF THE COMPETITION 
AUTHORITY AND THE COMPETITION COMMISSION 
 
 This component of the chapter elucidates on the institutional 
framework of the Authority and the Commission and how the two clash in 
function which influences the operation of mergers. The Commission 
plays a dual role which creates the potential of bias in decision making in 
respect of merger hearings. The Act creates an inter-dependent 
relationship between the Competition Authority (the Authority) and the 
Competition Commission (the Commission). The Commission appears to 
act as a watchdog over the Authority. These two structures and the link 
emanating within them will be elucidated upon below.  
 The Competition Authority is created under section 4 of the Act. 
Section 6 provides that the Authority shall have a Chief Executive Officer 












Minister after consultation with the Commission and upon such terms and 
conditions as the Minister may determine. The Executive Secretary is 
responsible for the day to day management and functioning of the 
Authority. In dispensing these functions, this officer will be subject to the 
general supervision of the Commission.159 Other functions of the 
Executive Secretary such as recommendation of appointment of senior 
officers of the Authority are also subject to the final decision on the matter 
being made by the Commission160. The Authority can prosecute matters 
before the Commission,161 refer matters it has adjudicated to the 
Commission,162 and it may also deal with any matter referred to it by the 
Commission.163 For this reason the Commission plays an administrative 
role over the Authority. 
  The Commission is created under section 9. The Commission is 
conferred with quasi judicial functions in addition to its administrative 
functions, because it is given power to determine competition cases.164 
The glitch in the structure is raised in that the Authority is given the power 
to investigate and prosecute complaints relating to anti-competitive 
behaviour, yet the Executive Secretary who would have presided over or 
authorised the investigation is enjoined to sit as Secretary of the 
Commission in any adjudicative process.165 This means that the 
Executive Secretary will be in a position of conflict in that he is aware of 
the information in issue before the Commission.  
 The provisions relating to the function of the Commission, it is 
submitted, place the Commission in a vulnerable role. The Commission is 
constituted by 7 members.166 These members are not necessarily trained 
in the area of competition, and are appointed by the Minister from 
selected persons having expertise in industry, commerce, economics, 
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law, consumer affairs or public administration167 and are all appointed on 
a part time basis. These officers have not received any training for 
purposes of implementing merger decisions or any other issue in 
competition law for that matter. This places the actual decision making at 
risk in that the personnel making important competition law decisions, 
such as determination of mergers, are not learned on the subject. The 
Commission it is submitted, may then possibly have to rely on employees 
of the Competition Authority for support and guidance in their decision 
making process. This may create over dependence on the Authority. It is 
submitted that this places the Commission in a questionable position so 
far as dispensing of its quasi-judicial functions is concerned.  
 The Commission has a duality of roles. It firstly sits as a board 
giving guidance to the Authority and as a Tribunal hearing and 
determining cases. This duality creates a problem in that the 
independence of the Commission as an adjudicating body cannot be 
guaranteed. This goes against aims of operation of a competition law in 
requiring that decision making be on an impartial basis. In addition, the 
issue of informational bias is raised. By the time the Commission sits to 
determine cases, it will have already been aware of them whilst sitting as 
a Board. Having prior knowledge may lead to members of the 
Commission pre-judging merger cases which are brought before them. 
Where loyalty of an institution such as the Commission appears to move 
towards the Authority, the result could be that Commissioners are so 
committed to the objectives of the Authority that they might be incapable 
of holding the balance fairly between those objectives and other 
interests.168 
 In terms of section 67 of the Act, matters brought before the 
Commission are appealable to the High Court. The Authority is entitled to 
appear before the Commission and like any other party that appears 
before the Commission is also entitled to appeal decisions of the 
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Commission to the High Court. Since the Commission oversees 
operation of the Authority, where the Authority decides to appeal its 
decisions to the High Court, it would have to convene a meeting to pass a 
resolution enabling the Authority to properly appear before the High 
Court. In this regard, the Commission plays the role of adjudicator and 
then appellant and this is clearly an institutional hiccup in terms of 
structure. The Commission is marred with likelihood of bias and it is 
submitted that this is likely to be raised on appearance before the 
Botswana high court. To date no matters from the Commission have 
been appealed to the high court. This however does not mean that none 
will ever arise. When any matter reaches the high court by way of such 
an appeal, it is likely that the issue of institutional bias may be raised. 
The administrative law principle nemo judex in causa sua rule 
translates literally into ~ no one should be a judge in their own case. This 
rule is linked to the legal principle that each person appearing before a 
judicial body has the right to an independent and impartial tribunal. It is 
submitted that both derive from the principle that justice must not only be 
done, but also be seen to be done in the eyes of the public.  
Independence relates to the relationship between an adjudicator 
and the parties appearing before him. Where there is a strong 
relationship between the adjudicator and a party appearing before him, 
then the independence of the adjudicator is compromised. It is important 
that there be no doubt as to the fairness and due process in a matter, as 
these ensure that the adjudication in a matter was done with neutrality 
and fair mindedness. It is noteable that independence and neutrality are 
not synonymous. In Gillies v Secretary of State for Works and 
Pensions169 the court stated as follows: 
“Impartiality is not the same as independence, although the 
two are closely linked. Impartiality is the Tribunal’s 
approach to deciding cases before it. Independence is the 
structural or institutional framework which secures this 
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impartiality, not only in the minds of the tribunal members 
but also perceptions of the public.” 
 The Commission as noted above resolves disputes and 
disagreements on issues investigated by the Authority and at the same 
time it plays an administrative role over the Authority.170 In addition the 
Executive Secretary of the Authority who is responsible for the day to day 
functioning of the Authority also sits as Secretary of the Commission.171 
There is a duality of roles being performed by the same person and this 
somewhat compromises the independence and impartiality of the 
Commission.  
There is no clear separation in the institutional set up of the 
Authority and the Commission and this raises the potential of bias in 
decision making. In R v. Lippe172 the test for institutional bias was stated 
as follows: 
“Whether having regard inter alia to the parties who appear 
before a decision maker, a fully informed person would 
harbour a reasonable apprehension in a substantial number 
of cases.” 
 Based on the above principle therefore, the Commission must not 
only be free from bias, but must also be seen as being unbiased. 
Presence of the likelihood of bias or indeed actual bias in the minds of 
the public may result in loss of confidence in the Commission going 
forward. And it is therefore submitted that there has to be a clear cut 
separation of power in the provisions and operation of the Authority and 
the Commission. Again there is a drafting error which was not anticipated 
on a practical level and needs to be amended. The connection and inter 
dependence between the two offices should be eradicated. The two 
offices should be completely independent of one another. 
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3.6 ASSESSMENT OF MERGERS 
 At this juncture, the chapter discusses the assessment of mergers 
and links the criteria used for decision making in merger control with the 
provisions for assessment. Commentary will be made as to how the 
criteria provided for merger assessment has influenced the acceptance or 
rejection of decided mergers in Botswana thus far. Some mergers have 
been given conditional approval where there appears to be anti 
competitive behaviours which can be remedied. At the time of writing this 
paper, the Authority had decided on 36 mergers173  most of which have 
been implemented. Several merger decisions have been selected for 
discussion herein to demonstrate the link with assessment.  
Section 59 (1) provides for the assessment of a proposed merger. 
The Authority shall first determine whether the proposed transaction: 
“(a) would be likely to prevent or substantially lessen 
competition or to restrict tr de or the provision of any 
service or to endanger the continuity of supplies or services; 
or 
(b) would be likely to result in any enterprise, including an 
enterprise which is not involved as a party in the proposed 
merg r, acquiring a dominant position in a market.” 
Therefore in assessing a merger the Authority will have to weigh a 
broad number of factors and assess whether based on the particular 
sector in which the business operates there would be lessening or 
restriction in competition and further whether there would be dominance 
in the market of that particular business as a result of the merger.  
 Public interest is an important consideration in the regulation of 
mergers; it takes the enquiry further by seeking further justification. It is 
vital because it provides a broader spectrum of regulating mergers by 
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engaging in an assessment of further benefits to a country’s economy 
other than lessening of competition and abuse of dominance. Public 
interest considerations weigh more heavily in developing countries than 
they do in developed countries.174 Thus, section 59 (2) provides that in 
addition the Authority may consider any factor which bears upon broader 
public interest in the proposed merger. This is to the extent that: 
“(a) the proposed merger would be likely to result in a 
benefit to the public which would outweigh any detriment 
attributable to a lessening of competition or the acquisition 
or strengthening of a dominant position in a market; 
(b) the merger may improve, or prevent a decline in the 
production or distribution of goods or the provision of 
services; 
(c) the merger may promote technical or economic 
progress, having regard to Botswana’s development needs; 
(d) the proposed merger would be likely to affect a 
particular industrial sector or region; 
(e) the proposed merger would maintain or promote exports 
or employment; 
(f) the merger may advance citizen empowerment initiatives 
or enhance the competitiveness of citizen-owned small and 
medium enterprises; or  
(g) the merger may affect the ability of national industries to 
compete in international markets.” 
 In deciding a proposed merger, the Authority has to consider all of 
the requirements of section 59 to the extent they are relevant to a 
particular proposed merger. The merger decisions discussed below give 
an insight on the deliberations engaged in by the Authority.  
                                                          
174
 PS Mehta Evolution of Competition Laws and their Enforcement, A Political Economy Perspective 












In the Anglo American/DeBeers merger, Anglo American PLC 
sought to acquire 40% of the shares in De Beers.175 In assessing this 
merger, the Authority noted that there were no substantive competition 
concerns that will arise in the mining sector or in the sale of diamonds. 
The market involved in this merger is one that forms the driving force of 
the Botswana economy which is diamonds. The merger it was found 
would not result in lessening of competition as the transaction involved a 
share buy back between two shareholders in De Beers. The Authority 
also stipulated that although the merged entity in the sale of rough 
diamonds is a monopoly, there was no established track record of abuse 
of dominant market power in this particular market to warrant abuse of 
dominance under the Act.176  
The merger would have a positive significant effect on public 
interest in Botswana in terms of technical or economic progress which is 
seen as relevant to the development of Botswana. The merger would 
create more value in the upstream mining operations and management 
functions. Another important consideration in the decision making 
process of this merger was the fact that the Government is involved in 
decision making process undertaken by Debswana and DTCB which 
could serve as a regulatory measure which would deter Anglo American 
from abusing its position in the market. 
In arriving at its decision the Authority was cognisant of the fact 
that there was dominance, yet it still authorised the merger. The fact that 
the merger involved a driving force of the Botswana economy was clearly 
an influential factor. Consideration was made as to the overall effect of 
the merger on the functioning and operation of the economy. A 
government will look to make sure that its economy continues to grow, 
even more so that in this case it was by way of a share buy-back by a 
pre-existing shareholder.  This may not always be good for the greater 
good of the economy. It is important that provision be made for 
government intervention in merger regulation so as to regulate state the 
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limit of state intervention. This would be a protection against possibility of 
any nepotism or corruption from senior government officials. It is 
noteworthy, however that, the application section of the Act177 binds the 
State to the extent that it engages is trade or business for the production, 
supply or distribution of goods or the provision of any service within any 
market in Botswana that is open to participation by other enterprises.  
 Another interesting approved merger was the acquisition of 100% 
issued share capital in Bokamoso Private Hospital by Kalend (Pty) Ltd.178 
Bokamoso is a private hospital which began its operations in the early 
2000’s and due to financial constraints the hospital was placed under 
liquidation and was acquired by a new entity. This merger was authorised 
despite the fact that the market share covered by this merger was 35%, 
which is 10% more than the dominance threshold. The Authority based 
its decision on the fact that it did not expect the market structure to 
change any time soon in Botswana. This merger was in the market of 
health services and allowing it was good for the growth of that sector as 
better medical and health services would be afforded to Botswana and 
also bearing in mind that there are only two private hospitals in 
Botswana. On a public interest assessment, this decision satisfies section 
59 (2) (b) which provides for improvement in distribution of services as a 
public interest consideration.  
The Authority has approved a merger based on the commitment 
by an enterprise to enhance the economy with respect to a particular 
market. One such example is in the case of Clover South Africa (CSA) 
which acquired 30% of the shares in Clover Botswana (CB).179 CSA 
made a commitment to expand their business in Botswana by assisting in 
the upstream of the raw milk supply industry and in particularly small 
scale dairy producers. The undertakings were that CSA shall: 
                                                          
177
 Section 3. 
178
 This merger decision was published on the 21
st
 of May 2012. 
179
 This merger decision was published on the 27
th












(a) identify a local farmer and allow the same to develop 
his dairy business, through providing technical assistance 
with regard to good dairy practice; 
(b) help start cluster farming on Botswana by firstly, 
identifying land that is suitable for dairy farming with access 
to electricity and water. Secondly contacting financing 
institutions and give the security that all milk produced with 
be collected and processed by CB; and 
(c) support the farm by providing dairy management 
training and technical advice, sourcing of good quality cows 
and be used as a training facility for future dairy farmers and 
herd managers who want to produce milk on a commercial 
basis.” 
By authorizing the merger on these conditions, the Authority has to 
conduct a review in future to ensure that the undertakings made by CSA 
were in fact fulfilled. It is submitted that this is an enhancement to citizen 
empowerment initiatives which falls under the provisions for public 
interest.180 And further, the Authority has placed itself in a position of 
accountability in future, and this is praiseworthy.  
In April 2013, one of the largest supermarket chains in Botswana 
selling fast moving consumer goods, Choppies Enterprises Limited 
(Choppies) submitted a merger notification. The Authority notified the 
public of the proposed merger between Choppies, Supasave (Pty) Ltd 
(Supasave) and Megasave (Pty) Ltd (Megasave).181 In terms of the 
notice, Choppies sought to acquire all the shares in Supasave and 
Megasave. At the time of submission of the notice, Choppies had a total 
of 70 retail stores in Botswana and South Africa and an estimated market 
share on 30% in the fast moving consumer good market in Botswana.  
Supasave was in the same industry as Choppies and Megasave was 
incorporated for the purpose of sourcing and supplying stock to 
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Supasave. Supasave operated 6 stores in Botswana before the merger 
went through and accounted for less than a percentage of the market 
share.   
This notification raised a lot of public controversy in Botswana. 
Public speculation was that Choppies sought to enter into the merger to 
block another player in the market, Sefalana Holdings which had shown 
interest in acquiring Megasave and Supasave.182  Some commentators 
did not see any problem with the proposed merger. The argument being 
that the only aspect which appeared to make no sense was why 
Choppies would go for such a small entity and also how the merger 
would be of any benefit to consumers.183  
On the other hand Dr Tebogo Magang, a lecture in Corporate 
Governance and Management at the University of Botswana had a 
pessimistic approach towards the merger. In his view, success of the 
merger would result in Choppies taking control of the market and possible 
increase in prices. He further opined that consumers and employees 
were not likely to benefit from the merger and that what would possibly 
occur was the restructuring of the enterprise resulting in possible job 
losses.184 This would go against the public interest considerations in the 
Act. Sefalana notified the Authority of its objection to the merger.  
The Competition Authority after conducting a hearing for the 
opposition of the merger approved it. It stated that in assessing the 
merger, substantial competition concerns arose in the fast moving 
consumer goods market in Gaborone, Molepolole and Palapye.185 This 
was explained to be due to the fact that the merging parties were close 
competitors in both product and geographic market dimensions. The 
Authority continued by stating that the proposed merger is expected to 
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enhance the acquiring enterprise’s already existing dominance.186 
Dominance was in particular expected to demonstrate itself in enhanced 
buyer power in the upstream market which is not necessarily likely to 
result in choppies being a low priced retailer as evidenced in a 
comparative pricing survey done by the Authority.    
The Authority continued to state that given the competition issues 
that arose, on the other hand there is a glaring reality that the target 
enterprises are confirmed competitive failures that is failing firms. It then 
stated that ordinarily, the decision should be rejected. It noted further that 
the transaction raised plausible competition concerns which on a balance 
of probabilities could not be ignored despite the failing firm defence. 
Inclusion of the failing firm defence in the assessment of this merger is 
indication that even though the defence has not been explained in the 
Act, and only alluded to in the Regulations, it is an applicable defence. An 
equal submission is therefore made that the Act should be amended to 
include this principle as part of the assessment criteria to match up with 
the Regulations.   
The Authority noted that it had satisfied itself with the failing firm 
realities of the case and in particular the absence of counter notification 
and further that it would not want to have a market situation that is 
uncontrollable and disastrous to the welfare of employees as a result of 
the eminent exit of Supasave and Megasave from the relevant markets 
on Gaborone, Molepolole and Palapye.  
Based on the above, the Authority stated that it would cautiously 
and reluctantly approve the transaction with the condition that: 
“Choppies should take over the two entities as going 
concerns but Choppies within the next five years should 
provide the Authority with a reasonable exit plan (including 
a public notice) to divest from the target outlets which are in 
the vicinity of existing Choppies outlets...” 













The decision of the Authority in this merger is evidence that in 
making its decisions there are lot of considerations that come into play. 
The controversies raised in the Choppies merger are similar to those 
raised in the Wal-Mart/Massmart merger in South Africa, in respect of the 
effect on competition.   
Most of the mergers notified to the Authority since it began its 
operation in November 2011 have been authorised, however some have 
been refused. On the 10th April 2012 the Authority refused a merger 
involving the acquisition of 100% issued shares in Shield Security by G4S 
(Botswana) Limited. This merger was to be in the market of the provision 
of security services. The Authority propounded that on the assessment of 
the proposed merger there were competition concerns that would arise in 
the security services industry in Botswana. Should the merger have gone 
through, there would have been a 53 per cent market share in the 
security services market and a 33 per cent market share in the alarm and 
response market share, which were both significantly above the 25 per 
cent threshold dominance.  
The acquiring enterprise was considered to have substantial 
market power in view of the market structure for security services in 
Botswana. Further, it was found that the proposed transaction would 
likely result in the removal of a “small but significant” competitor 
particularly in the alarm and response services market in Botswana and 
by so doing would enhance G4S’s continued dominance in the market. 
The Authority further found that there was no demonstration of likely 
public benefit in the proposed merger and there would be no public 
benefit which would outweigh any detriment attributable to the 
strengthening of a dominant position in a market by G4S and to the 
removal of a “small but significant” competitor, despite the commitment 
made by the parties to maintain employment. 
  The decision in this merger contrasts with the decisions in the 
Clover and Choppies mergers discussed above. Despite undertakings 












demonstrates that the Authority does in fact in its assessment, go through 
considerations as provided for in the Act and also on a practical sense in 
view and in light of the way markets operate at a particular time. This is 
praiseworthy considering that it is relatively new.  
The provisions for the assessment of mergers are broad in that 
they are not limited to the likelihood of lessening competition and abuse 
of dominance. They encompass what may be described as a developing 
country perspective in consideration merger regulation. This stems from 
the economic differences in developed and developing countries and 




 This chapter enunciated on the operation of mergers in Botswana. 
It noted the shortcomings in drafting which have led to problems in 
regulation and also problems likely to arise. Suggestions for reform were 
made in respect of irregularities and shortcomings so as to improve on 
the functioning of the merger system going forward. It was demonstrated 
that although there are anomalies, there are aspects of merger regulation 
which are praiseworthy. The methods used for merger assessment thus 
far by the Authority are praiseworthy. Even though there is need and 
room for improvement the system is not a complete disaster. Because it 

















CHAPTER 4 - COMPARITIVE ANALYSIS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
 This chapter discusses the regulation of mergers in the Republic of 
South Africa and in Zambia on a comparative basis with Botswana. The 
reason for this comparative analysis is to assess how other jurisdictions 
in Southern Africa with a longer and more developed history in merger 
regulation have dealt with same.  
A brief history of competition law in these jurisdictions will 
demonstrate that they have gone through a lot of transformations in 
respect of their competition law. They have had to effect amendments to 
their legislation and in particular to the way mergers have been dealt with. 
By benchmarking, Botswana has been able to avoid some of the 
problems which both South Africa and Zambia went through before 
amending and repealing their competition legislation.  There are some 
complete adaptations in South African and Zambian competition laws 
which have been put in the Botswana Act.  
Arrangement and function of institutional and regulatory 
frameworks in the chosen jurisdictions will be discussed. These are 
important in so far as merger regulation is concerned because they are 
the structures through which decision making in respect of mergers is 
conducted. In that regard their set up and structure has to be fitting for 
proper operation and implementation of merger law.  
4.2 THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA  
4.2.1 A BRIEF HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICAN COMPETITION LAW 
 
 The Competition Act of 1998187 (the SA Act) regulates competition 
in South Africa. The country has gone through various changes in the 
nature of its competition policy and law. The first piece of legislation 
geared at regulating competition was the Regulation of Monopolistic 
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Conditions Act 24 of 1955. This act was in operation for 24 years and it 
was the first major comprehensive legislation for the regulation of 
monopolistic conditions in South Africa.188 As the name suggests, the 
scope of this act was limited to monopolistic conditions which today are 
known as restrictive practices. The Board of Trade and Industry was 
charged with investigating conduct, recommending remedies and 
negotiating and supervising compliance.189 This board had no 
independent powers of investigation or relief. The 1955 Act was limited in 
scope, therefore it was not effective. A commission of enquiry was set to 
analyze its inefficiencies. This commission was known as the Mouton 
Commission and it gave its report in 1977. 
 One of the weaknesses found under the 1955 Act was its inability 
to deal effectively with the merger problem.190 Horiz ntal and vertical 
mergers could fall within the definition of a monopolistic condition, but 
conglomerate activity, except where it restricted competition fell outside 
the 1955 Act.191 The Mouton Commission made various considerations in 
its report, with the starting point being that a competition policy for South 
Africa should view the economy as a total concept [in which] both the 
private and public sector are included.192 From as far back as the 1970’s 
and despite the political situation in South Africa there has been 
recognition of the salient features of a well functioning competition law.  
The Mouton Commission recognized that whether there was 
effective competition in a particular situation depended on the structure of 
the market, its behaviour and the economic performance of the players in 
the sense of effective utilisation of resources, economic growth, 
generation of profits, an equitable distribution of income and development 
of skills work and opportunity for all.193 Structure, behaviour and 
performance had to be taken into account for a proper evaluation of the 
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market situation and its effects on the public interest.194 The Mouton 
Commission also called for a new competition body with more resources, 
stronger penalties against violations of orders and the extension of the 
law to cover mergers.195 It also called for a new institutional structure that 
would have followed the UK’s ‘tripartite’ system of a supervising ministry, 
a separate enforcement body and a more independent decision making 
tribunal.196 
The end result of the Mouton Commission’s recommendations was 
the enactment of the Maintenance and Promotion of Competition Act (the 
1979 Act) 197 which came into effect in 1980. The 1979 Act did not adopt 
all recommendations of the Mouton Commission, such as the proposal to 
have a Merger Tribunal. As the years progressed, this legislation proved 
to be problematic. At the attainment of independence in 1994, reviewing 
competition policy was on the top mandates agenda of the newly elected 
democratic government.198 In 1995 the Department of Trade and Industry 
(the DTI) embarked on a three year project of consultation with experts 
and stakeholders to develop a new competition policy framework and 
released Guidelines in 1997.199 Among others, the Guidelines noted that 
the 1979 Act lacked both pre-merger notification and meaningful post 
merger power of control.200  
Following extensive consultations, the Competition Act of 1998 
was finally drafted and took effect in 1999. This legislation was not only 
intended to deal with pure competition issues but was also intended to be 
a mechanism to restructure industry in South Africa as well as to meet 
claims of previously disadvantaged communities, small business and 
labour.201 The SA Act has been in operation for 15 years and its 
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provisions on merger regulation and the institutions set up for same are 
exemplary.   
4.2.2 MERGER CONTROL UNDER THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
COMPETITION ACT OF 1998 
 
Mergers are provided for under Chapter 3 of the SA Act.202 Section 
11 provides for thresholds and categories of mergers. An innovation in 
the SA Act is that it provides for two thresholds.203 The Minister204 in 
consultation with the Commission first of all determines a lower and 
higher threshold of combined annual turnover or assets, or a lower and 
higher threshold of combinations of turnover and assets in South Africa, 
in general or specific industries for purposes of determining categories of 
mergers.205 The next step is formulating a method of calculation of the 
annual turnover or assets to be applied in relation to the thresholds.206  
This determination may be changed by the Minister in consultation with 
the Competition Commission.207  
It is submitted that the provision for change in threshold, is 
outstanding in the sense that it allows for adjustment to the current state 
of the economy at any given point in time. Under Botswana law, there is 
no provision for change in threshold. The current threshold amount is 
likely to become obsolete overtime; depending on economic progression 
or regression.  A provision similar to that in South Africa is safer and 
should be adopted. 
Before the threshold can be determined, a notice has to be 
published in the Gazette setting out the proposed threshold and method 
of calculation for purposes of section 11208 and the notice will invite 
written submissions on the proposal.209 There is a six month period given 
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for the publication of the new determined threshold. The notice of the new 
threshold published in the Gazette must specify the new threshold; the 
method of calculating it and the effective date of the threshold,210 again 
this is commendable as it gives crisp and elaborate regulation. 
The SA Act categorises mergers into three under section 11 (5) as 
follows: 
“(a) “a small merger” means a merger or a proposed merger 
with a value at or below the lower threshold established in 
terms of section 11 (a); 
(b) “an intermediate merger” means a merger or proposed 
merger with a value between the lower and higher threshold 
established in terms of section 11 (a); and 
(c) “a large merger” means a merger or proposed merger 
with a value at or above the higher threshold established in 
terms of section 11 (a).”  
The threshold will determine the category in which a merger falls. 
The current threshold took effect as at 1st April 2009. The SA 
Commission must be notified of all intermediate mergers and acquisitions 
if the value of the proposed merger equals or exceeds R 560 million211  
and the annual turnover or asset value of the transferred/target firm is at 
least R 80 million.212 If the combined annual turnover or assets of both 
the acquiring and transferred/target firms are valued at or above R 6.6 
billion, and the annual turnover or asset value of the transferred/target 
firm is at least R 190 million the merger falls under the category of a large 
merger and must be notified as such.213  
As a way of providing assistance to practitioners, the SA 
Commission has developed a merger notification calculator to determine 
whether a merger is small, intermediate or large based on the amended 
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thresholds.214 Where it is small it is only notified on request of the 
Competition Commission.215 The categorization of mergers is impressive 
based on the size and performance of the South African economy. Owing 
to this categorization, intermediate and large mergers are not assessed 
by the same office. Intermediate mergers are considered by the South 
African Competition Commission.216 Whereas in the case of a large 
merger, after it has been notified to the South African Competition 
Commission, it is referred to the South African Tribunal for determination 
by that office. In the context of Botswana, it is submitted that this is 
something that should be considered in future, bearing in mind that the 
economy continues to grow.  
 Section 12 defines what a merger is. It appears that the Botswana 
definition of merger as well as what constitutes control is a total adaption 
of the provisions in the SA Act. Section 12A (1) provides for consideration 
of mergers. Similarly to the Botswana Act, in considering a merger, the 
first consideration to be made by the Competition Commission or the 
Competition Tribunal is whether the merger is likely to substantially 
prevent or lessen competition. The section further provides further that: 
“(a) if it appears that the merger is likely to substantially 
prevent or lessen competition then determine- 
(i) whether or not the merger is likely to result in any 
technological, efficiency or other pro competitive gain which 
will be greater than, and offset, the effects of any prevention 
and lessening of competition that may result or is likely to 
result from the merger, and would not likely be obtained if 
the merger is prevented; and  
(ii) whether the merger can or cannot be justified on 
substantial public interest grounds by assessing the factors 
set out in subsection (3); or 
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(b) otherwise determine whether a merger can or cannot be 
justified on public interest grounds by assessing the factors 
set out in subsection (3).” 
 This further provision makes the enquiry more stringent and 
therefore the analysis of determination is taken a notch higher. Further 
provision is made for determination of whether a merger is likely to 
substantially prevent or lessen competition by stating that an assessment 
of the strength of competition of the relevant markets and that the firms in 
the market after the merger will behave competitively or co-operatively 
taking into account any factor that is relevant in the market.217 The SA Act 
provides a number of market factors. In the context of Botswana there is 
no provision for such thorough market assessment.  
What appears to be a market assessment provision in the 
Botswana Act isolated in Chapter XII under the heading General 
Provisions.  Market assessment for mergers is grouped with market 
assessment for other restrictive practices. Moreover it is not the same 
provision as under the SA Act which is intended to determine whether 
there has been lessening of competition in a particular market.  In the 
Botswana Act provision is for determination of a market in an industry by 
looking at the goods and services provided. It is humbly submitted that 
market assessment for mergers in Botswana be provided in a similar 
manner as under the SA Act.  
 Section 12A (3) provides that when determining whether a merger 
can or cannot be justified on public interest grounds, the SA Commission 
and the SA Tribunal must consider the effect the merger will have on the 
following : 
  “(a) the particular industrial sector or region; 
  (b) employment; 
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(c) the ability of small businesses, or firms controlled or 
owned by historically disadvantaged persons, to become 
competitive; 
(d) and the ability of national industries to compete in 
international markets.” 
The public interest enquiry appears to be limited only to these four 
grounds.218 The public interest enquiry under the Botswana Act is 
broader and largely different to the enquiry under the SA Act. A complete 
adaptation of the enquiry in the SA Act would not work under Botswana 
law as it is mostly based on the political history of South Africa which has 
no bearing on Botswana.  The current adaptation of public interest under 
Botswana law is practical to function in the context of Botswana. 
 Due to the categorization there are different provisions for 
notification and implementation of mergers. One such provision that 
needs mention herein is that in notifying intermediate and large mergers 
there is a requirement that a copy of the merger notice be provided to any 
registered trade union that represents a substantial number of its 
employees,219 or employees or representatives concerned if there are no 
such registered trade unions.220 The SA Tribunal has recognized that the 
SA Act extends to employees and that trade unions have the right to 
timeous information about the potential impact of a merger on 
employment.221 Botswana does not have a corresponding provision. It is 
submitted that such a provision be included in the Botswana Act, to 
protect employees.  
  In terms of section 18 (1), the Minister may participate as a party 
in any intermediate or large merger to make representations on the public 
interest grounds set out in section 12A (3). The Minister in this respect is 
a representative of the government. The South African government 
recently intervened in the Wal-mart and Massmart Merger. Following 
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Wal-mart’s announcement of the merger and notification to the SA 
Commission, the Economic Development Department appointed and 
expert panel to conduct research on the implication of the proposed 
merger. The expert panel reported that owing to the size and international 
exposure of Wal-mart, employment, the welfare of local manufacturers 
and small business would be affected by the transaction.222  This type of 
provision should also be introduced in Botswana. This way, where the 
government appears to be overly involved or interested in a merger or 
where it intervenes it will have unquestionable legislative backing.  
4.2.3 THE INSTITUTIONAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF THE 
COMPETITION ACT OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 The institutional arrangement under the SA Act is divided as 
follows; the Competition Commission (the SA Commission), the 
Competition Tribunal (the SA Tribunal) and the Competition Appeal Court 
(the Appeal Court).223 It is important to note at this juncture that in South 
Africa, a specialized court dealing specifically with competition law 
matters has been established.  
 Section 19 provides for the establishment and constitution of the 
Competition Commission. The Commission is the equivalent of the 
Authority under Botswana law. However, the SA Act has better provisions 
for this office. The SA Commission has jurisdiction throughout South 
Africa, is a juristic person and must exercise its functions in accordance 
with SA Act. The SA Commission is independent and subject only to the 
constitution and the law224 and further it must be impartial and perform its 
functions without fear, favour or prejudice.225 Provisions are made for 
activities which the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and members 
of staff of the SA Commission may not engage in. These include 
participating in any investigation, hearing or decision concerning a matter 
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in respect of which that person has a direct financial interest or any 
similar interest226 and making private use of, or profit from, any 
confidential information obtained as a result of performing functions in the 
Commission.227   
Each organ of state must assist the SA Commission to maintain its 
independence and impartiality to effectively carry out its powers and 
duties.228 This crisp codification makes the operation of the SA 
Commission clear. It ensures that there is transparency which it is 
submitted encourages confidence in this office. These provisions should 
be adopted under the Botswana Act to makes its provisions less 
ambiguous and foster towards improvement is the Authority’s function in 
respect of merger regulation. 
 The functions of the SA Commission are set out elaborately just 
like those of the Authority. In addition to the functions set out, the SA 
Commission is expected to report to the Minister on any matter relating to 
the SA Act229 and enquire into and report to the Minister on any matter 
concerning the purposes of the SA Act. Submissions made to the 
Minister, must then be tabled before the National Assembly. The SA Act 
places a lot of reliance on he Minister and consultation with Parliament. 
Although this ensures tighter regulation, it may in some circumstances 
fiddle with and interrupt the independence in function of the SA 
Commission. 
 Section 22 provides for the appointment of a Commissioner. The 
office of commissioner under the SA Act is synonymous with that of 
executive secretary of the Authority. The Commissioner is appointed by 
the Minister and must be a suitable person with qualifications and 
experience in economics, law, commerce, industry or public office.230 
Again the SA Act has crisp and clear provisions which guide with the 
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functioning of competition law and merger regulation. This clarity ensures 
that there is no confusion in respect of the functioning of this office.  
Provision is made for the appointment of a Deputy Commissioner 
who will act as an assistant to the Commissioner or perform the functions 
of commissioner where they are unable to dispense with their duties. This 
is necessary for purposes of ensuring that an important office in merger 
regulation is never left vacant. Under the Botswana Act the same person 
who acts Executive Secretary of the Authority also sits as the 
Chairperson of the Commission231. Under the SA Act, there is a 
distinction which clears the possibility or likelihood of any institutional 
bias.  
 Unlike the Botswana Act, the SA Act makes provision for the office 
of inspector under a specific provision.232 The inspector is appointed by 
the Commissioner from employees of the SA Commission or from a 
selection of any other suitable person.233 However, just like the Botswana 
Act, there is no provision as to the qualification of such an officer. This 
adaptation has left Botswana law wanting and as alluded to in chapter 
two should be remedied.   
 The SA Tribunal is established under section 26. It is comparable 
with the Commission under Botswana law and it is established in the 
same way as the SA Commission and it is noted that it is a Tribunal of 
record.234 The SA Tribunal is constituted by a chairperson and more than 
3 but not less than 10 other women or men appointed by the President.235 
It is remarkable that under the SA Act appointment is by the President 
which contrasts with the situation under Botswana law. It is submitted that 
under the SA Act this office is treated with a lot more seriousness than 
under the Botswana Act. Involvement of the President in the appointment 
of personnel for the SA Tribunal takes it to a higher level of consultation 
and will also probably ensure greater precision in selection of the most 
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ideal person for the post. There is nothing stopping Botswana from 
adopting a similar provision. 
 An interesting further provision is that all members of the Tribunal 
must represent a broad cross section of the population of South Africa 
and must comprise persons with sufficient legal training to satisfy the 
requirement of section 31 (2) (a). The Botswana Act also provides for 
specific qualifications to be held by the members of its Commission.236 It 
does not however have provision for representation across a broad 
cross-section of the population and such a provision may not ever be 
necessary under Botswana law, because Botswana does not have the 
ethnic differences which South Africa suffered so gravely under the 
apartheid era. 
 The third segment of the institutional and regulatory framework in 
South Africa is the SA Appeal Court. It has been set up as an 
independent body which specifically deals with matters relating to the 
operation of competition law. A visit to this court’s website demonstrates 
that the bulk of cases are in respect of merger regulation.237 Its set up 
and function is therefore paramount in respect of merger regulation.  
The SA Appeal Court is established and constituted under section 
36 of the SA Act. It is a court contemplated under section 166 (e) of the 
Constitution238 with a status akin to that of the South African High 
Court,239  having jurisdiction throughout South Africa240 and is a court of 
record. 241 As this court is on equal footing with the High Court, its 
decisions may be appealed to the South African Supreme Court. Where a 
matter has any constitutional implications it may be appealed to the 
South African Constitutional court.   
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The SA Appeal Court constitutes of at least 3 judges appointed by 
the president of South Africa242 one of whom will be the judge president. 
Matters may reach this court by way of review or appeal from the SA 
Tribunal.243 Having this third tier of regulation is commendable and will 
ensure expeditious settling of merger decisions. 
Regulation of mergers is a specialised field and setting up of 
courts dealing with their control is very impressive. Although the 
Botswana economy is not as diverse as the South African economy, it is 
submitted that because of the distinct nature of competition law and more 
specifically merger regulation, Botswana should consider competition law 
specialised courts. The down side of this would be that judges may 
incorrectly interpret competition law because of its specialised nature. 244 
 The SA Act has clear and elaborate provisions relating to its 
institutional and regulatory framework in so far as merger regulation in 
South Africa is concerned and this is appreciated. It is submitted that 
Botswana should learn from the way in which provisions have been 
drafted and more importantly how they function. There is clear and 
undisputed separation in the institutional framework, which is not the 
case in Botswana.  
4.3 ZAMBIA 
4.3.1 BRIEF HISTORY OF ZAMBIAN COMPETITION LAW  
 
Competition law in Zambia developed in the early nineties. The 
country’s trade regime became considerably liberalised and this was 
followed by substantial decentralisation and deregulation in other spheres 
of economic activity.245 The Zambian economy was a mixed welfare 
economy with social welfare as the main objective. However liberalisation 
of state enterprises as well as on the trade front in the wake of Zambia’s 
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structural adjustment policy had a drastic effect on the country and led to 
emergence of conditions which necessitated the creation of a competition 
policy.246  
Zambia moved towards a competitive market regime by reducing 
the role of the government in the economy and removing high levels of 
ownership concentration through market liberalisation, privatisation and 
public participation.247 The government sought to put in place a 
competition enforcement mechanism that would ensure that the gains of 
privatisation and the new investment that was coming into the country 
would not be eroded by the anti-competitive conduct of private monopoly 
and dominant players in the new liberalized economy.248 Thus the 
Competition and Fair Trading Act of 1994(the 1994 Act)249 was 
promulgated to deal with and prohibit anticompetitive practices. 
The 1994 Act was premised on two underlying principles. The first 
was that any behaviour which had the object, or effect, of substantially 
lessening competition in a market was prohibited.250 Prohibited conduct 
included mergers and acquisitions which essentially lessen competition in 
a substantial market. During its operation it became apparent that the 
1994 Act was beset by a number of inconveniences which were inter alia, 
the definition of mergers and notification of mergers and coverage of 
public interest.251 The enforcement authority under the 1994 Act which 
was a commission also faced challenges relating to issues of limited 
investigative powers, a wide institutional mandate and absence of a 
leniency programme.252 
As a result of the problems experienced under the 1994 Act, 
Zambia engaged in the formulation of a national competition and 
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consumer policy.  The country only engaged in formulation of a policy 
when it sought to repeal already existing legislation due to arising 
inconveniences. This differs from the situation in Botswana where there 
was policy formulation to analyze and assess the state of the economy 
before drafting legislation. Although having a policy before drafting is 
commendable, in the case of Zambia it was more beneficial as problem 
areas were already identified.  
The policy was approved by the Zambian cabinet253 and part of its 
implementation framework covered the issue of institutional 
arrangements. It states that the institutions that are important for 
implementation of competition law are the commission, sector regulators 
and the judiciary working together with stakeholders.254 Failure of 
adequate operation of the institutional framework under the 1994 Act 
meant that there was a gap in control and regulation of mergers. In 2010, 
the 1994 Act was repealed and replaced by the Competition and 
Consumer Protection Act (the 2010 Act).255   
4.3.2 MERGER CONTROL UNDER THE ZAMBIAN COMPETITION AND 
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 2010 
 
 Mergers are provided for under Part IV of the 2010 Act. A merger 
is defined in the same way as under the Botswana Act, save that the 
2010 Act continues to provide that a merger also occurs when two or 
more enterprises mutually agree to adopt arrangements for common 
ownership or control over the whole or part of a business.256  Likewise a 
merger is deemed to have occurred in the same way as in the Botswana 
Act, and there is an additional provision for circumstances where a joint 
venture occurs between two or more independent enterprises.257 
Whereas with control of an enterprise the same provisions as in the 
Botswana Act are used. It is noteworthy that in the 1994 Act, provision for 
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mergers was very scanty and not elaborate. The 2010 Act and the 
Botswana Act were promulgated around the same time. These provisions 
appear to be an adaptation of section 12 of the SA Act. Botswana and 
Zambia possibly resorted to drawing lessons from South Africa, as the 
sections in place had been tested and worked effectively over a long 
period of time.  Although the economies of the three countries are not on 
the same footing, from a developing country perspective, this adaptation 
of like provisions suffices for operation in each country.  
Under the 2010 Act, mergers are reviewable under two 
instances.258 Firstly where a merger meets a certain threshold 259 and 
secondly where the merger falls below the set threshold but the Zambia 
Commission deems it to be reviewable based on a number of factors.260 
The threshold for merger determination is set by the Minister in 
consultation with the Zambia Commission.261 A year after the 
promulgation of the 2010 Act, the Minister had still not set a threshold,262 
the result of this being that all mergers were therefore notifiable. The 
Regulations were promulgated in 2011.263 A merger transaction shall 
require authorisation by the Zambia Commission where the combined 
turnover or assets, which ever is higher, in Zambia of the merging parties, 
is at least fifty million fee units in their last financial year, for which the 
figures are available.264  Despite the absence of timeous publication 
threshold, provisions under the 2011 Zambia Regulations are consistent 
with the 2010 Act; this is in contrast to the anomaly under Botswana law.  
 The Zambia Commission may review mergers falling below the 
threshold where it reasonably believes inter alia that the merger is likely 
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to create a position of dominance in a localised product or geographic 
market265  or where the merger may substantially lessen competition.266 
This condition came as a reform under the 2010 Act. It is submitted that a 
similar provision would be valuable under the law of Botswana. It would 
be useful to regulate mergers that would act as harm to fair competition 
despite being below the set threshold.    
 The 2010 Act has a provision relating to Market Assessment.267 
Under this section, the Zambia Commission has to carry out a market 
assessment of the proposed merger to determine the likely effects of the 
proposed merger in the relevant market, on trade and the economy in 
general. It involves further enquiry which is a move in a positive direction. 
The impediment which would arise in implementing such a provision is 
whether there would be people with the relevant expertise and 
experience to engage in a proper market assessment. This is also a new 
reform to competition law in Zambia. In the South Africa discussion 
above,268 it was noted that the provisions for market assessment in 
Botswana are lacking and should be included in the legislation. The same 
observation and submission is made herein. 
Section 30 of the 2010 Act makes provision for competition 
assessment of a merger; this is the actual assessment of the merger. The 
first step is to consider whether a merger is likely to prevent or 
substantially lessen competition in Zambia.269 On noting that this is a 
general provision, the 2010 Act provides under section 30 (2) as follows: 
“(2) Notwithstanding the generality of subsection (1), the 
Commission shall in considering a proposed merger, take 
into account the likely and actual factors that affect 
competition in a defined market including 
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(a) the levels of concentration of players in the relevant 
market;270 
(b) the creation or strengthening of barriers to market 
entry; 
(c) the level of imports in the relevant market; 
(d) the extent to which there is countervailing buyer or 
supplier power  in the relevant market; 
(e) the availability of substitute products in the relevant 
market; 
(f) the likelihood of the merger removing from the 
market an existing effective and vigorous competitor; 
(g) the dynamic characteristics of the market including 
growth, innovation, pricing and other inherent market 
characteristics; and 
(h) the risk that a position of dominance may be 
abused.” 
Under Botswana law the assessment is limited to restrictive 
practices, abuse of dominance and consideration of public interest 
issues. The 2010 Act provides specifications of further considerations 
that the Zambia Commission has to bear in mind when assessing a 
merger. These additional considerations broaden the spectrum for 
regulation and make the assessment procedure easier because there is 
an elaboratio .  
The 2010 Act has distinct provisions relating to the public interest 
assessment, in the sense that there is a separate section for same.271 
This goes a step further into the enquiry of assessing a merger and is yet 
another reform to the new legislation in Zambia. One of the public interest 
assessments under the 2010 Act is considering public interest in respect 
of saving a failing firm.272 It is therefore submitted that additional provision 
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dealing with the assessment of mergers and public interest is necessary 
in the context of Botswana.  
In terms of the 2010 Act the period allowed for assessment of a 
merger is 90 days from the date of application for authorisation of the 
proposed merger.273 This is similar to the SA Act where assessment has 
to be done within 60 days.274 Under the Botswana Act it is only 30 
days.275 It is submitted that the determination of mergers is a delicate 
issue, requiring ample time. Therefore a 30 days determination does not 
suffice as sufficient time for that purpose. The proposition is that 
Botswana should extend this period.   
Even before repealing the 1994 Act, Zambia was able to 
successfully monitor a foreign merger takeover in the telecommunications 
sector.276 In 2005 the Zambia Commission received a formal notification 
from the MTN Group Limited of South Africa (MTN SA). MTN SA sought 
to purchase 100 percent of the capital of Telcel Zambia Limited (Telcel). 
The Zambia Commission considered that the acquisition was more likely 
to bring pro competitive benefits to the Zambian mobile 
telecommunications sector by increasing the investment and employment 
and by upgrading technology.  
The Commission granted final takeover subject to specific 
conditions. The first condition was that 10 percent of the capital of Telcel 
be blocked in Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) for Zambian public 
ownership and would be released to the public within fifteen to eighteen 
months. Secondly, within six months after taking over, MTN SA was 
mandated to identify a senior management official to be a Trade 
Practices Compliance Officer, in constant touch with the Zambia 
Commission. The constant communication would be for ensuring the 
implementation of undertakings and compliance with the 1994 Act. This 
goes to show that even though the 1994 Act was repealed, it still served 
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and relevant and necessary purpose in merger regulation, that should go 
by noticed. 
4.3.3 THE INSTITUTIONAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK UNDER 
THE COMPETITION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF ZAMBIA 
 
 The institutional framework under Zambian Law is two tier. The 
Zambia Competition Commission which was established under the 1994 
Act continues to exist under the 2010 Act. It has been renamed the 
Competition and Consumer Commission (the Zambia Commission).277 
Akin to Botswana and South African law the Zambian Commission is 
established as a body corporate capable of suing and being sued.278 
Mergers are reviewed by the Commission, which is constituted under the 
First Schedule.  
The composition of the Board of Commissioners shall be by a 
representative from the Ministry responsible for commerce, a 
representative of the Attorney General, five other members with 
experience and knowledge relevant to the Act appointed by the Minister. 
The Board shall appoint an Executive Director on such conditions as it 
may determine.279 The Executive Director shall be the chief executive 
director of the Commis ion and shall be responsible under the direction 
of the Board for the day to day running of the Commission.280 The 2010 
Act goes on to provide that the Executive Director shall be an ex-officio 
member of the Board.281 There are clear and crisp provisions for the 
Zambia Commission similarly to the SA Act. 
 Part VII of the 2010 Act provides for investigations and 
determination by the Commission. In particular the 2010 Act provides for 
remedies in respect of merger control. Where the Commission after 
investigation comes to the conclusion that an enterprise is a party to a 
merger and creation of the merger has resulted or is likely to result in a 
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substantial lessening of competition within a market of goods or services, 
it may give the enterprise such directions as it considers necessary and 
practicable to remedy same.282 
The remedies provided are in relation to a prospective merger283 
or a completed merger.284 With regard to a prospective merger the 
remedies include: requiring an enterprise to desist from completion or 
implementation of the merger insofar as it relates to a market in Zambia, 
divest such assets as specified in a direction within the period so 
specified in the direction, before the merger can be implemented or adopt 
or desist from such conduct including conduct in relation to prices as is 
specified in a direction as conduct of proceeding with the merger. In the 
case of a completed merger, the Commission may require an enterprise 
to divest itself of such assets as are specified in a direction within the 
period so specified in the direction or adopt or to desist from such 
conduct including conduct in relation to prices as is specified in the 
direction as a condition of maintaining or proceeding with the merger. 
This section is new to Zambia and is comparable to section 63 of the 
Botswana Act. 
Section 67 provides for the establishment of the Competition and 
Consumer Protection Tribunal (the Zambia Tribunal). The Zambia 
Tribunal serves the same purpose as the Commission in Botswana. Its 
membership consists of a legal practitioner of not less than ten years who 
shall be the Chairperson285, a representative of the Attorney General who 
shall be the Vice-Chairperson286 and three other members who shall be 
experts with no less than five years experience and knowledge, in 
matters relevant to the 2010 Act.   The 2010 Act further provides for 
persons who are disqualified from appointment to the Tribunal.287 These 
provisions ensure that no stone is left unturned; the legislation leaves 
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nothing to assumption or further clarification by the courts. The structure 
of the Zambia Tribunal is distinct in membership and seeks to cater 
adequately for membership.  
Three members of the Zambia Tribunal form a quorum288 for its 
proceedings. Decisions are made by way of majority vote at a sitting or in 
a meeting and where there is an equality of votes; the person presiding 
shall have a casting vote in addition to their deliberative vote.289 A party 
to a hearing has the option of being represented either by a legal 
practitioner or by any other person or may appear in person.290 Decisions 
made are in the form of a judgement and each party and person affected 
by the decision shall be furnished with a copy thereof.291 Where a 
member of the Zambian Tribunal has an interest in a matter he has to 
disclose such interest and shall not take part in the proceedings.292 
Where necessary the Zambia Tribunal may use assessors or experts for 
the purposes of proceedings.293 In Botswana, a quorum is formed by half 
of the members of the Commission294 and decision making is similar to 
that in Zambia. There are no provisions for recusal under the Botswana 
Act. This is a necessary reform for the development of Botswana 
competition law.  
Powers of the Zambia Tribunal include taking a course which may 
lead to the just, speedy and inexpensive of any matter.295 Persons giving 
false evidence to the Zambia Tribunal regarding material facts are liable 
to conviction or to a fine.296 The 2010 Act is couched in wide terms 
covering for a wide variety of issues and scenarios likely to arise, and this 
is very admirable.  
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Section 73 provides for decisions in respect of mergers. Where a 
merger is implemented in contravention to the 2010 Act the Zambian 
Tribunal may order a party to the merger to sell any shares, interest or 
other assets it has acquired pursuant to the merger297 or declare void any 
provision of an agreement to which a merger was subject.298 In addition 
or in lieu of making the preceding orders the Zambian Tribunal may direct 
any firm, or any person to sell any shares or interests or assets of the firm 
if the prohibited practice cannot be adequately remedied in terms of the 
2010 Act299 or is substantially conduct by that firm previously found by the 
Zambian Tribunal to have been a prohibited practice.300 Where a party is 
aggrieved by a decision of the Zambia Tribunal, they may appeal to the 
high court.301  
It is very impressive that provisions in respect of functioning of the 
Zambia Commission and the Tribunal go a notch higher and stipulate the 
manner in which merger cases shall be determined. This is evidence that 
under Zambian law, the key role played by mergers in competition law is 
recognised and catered for. This recognition exists under Botswana law 
as well. For Zambia it took a new Act to recognize the need for such a 
provision, whereas because of the fortune of benchmarking, Botswana 
was able to benefit first hand.  
4.4 CONCLUSION   
 
As a result of the anomalies that arise in the Botswana Act, it is 
submitted that a review of function be engaged in so as to amend and 
improve on the provisions of merger regulation and the institutional 
framework. It goes without saying that because the Botswana Act is still 
new and in addition because the competition law itself is still in its infancy 
stage, there are sure to be oversights, errors and omissions. The 
comparative analysis has demonstrated that in the benchmarking 
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exercise the drafters of the Botswana Act elected to incept some 
provisions and left out others. Some of the provisions that were left out 
were not and possibly would not be beneficial to Botswana. However 
there are some provisions which it is submitted should have been 
included in the Botswana Act as they would have been an aid to the 






























CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 CONCLUSIONS  
  
 The central aim of this paper was to asses whether the Botswana 
Competition Act adequately provides for the regulation of mergers. In so 
doing this paper engaged in a discussion of the processes involved in the 
drafting of competition legislation in Botswana. It was found that the steps 
employed in the preparation and drafting stages of the Act were crucial 
and imperative. They assisted Botswana in terms of perspective and 
direction on how to proceed in drafting legislation. One of the goals of 
competition law and particularly mergers is to aid commercial growth. By 
their introduction and implementation in Botswana, this purpose has to 
some extent been achieved. A competition law, no matter how well 
drafted will always have limitations in operation.  
By necessary implication the policies formulated and assistance 
sought benefited the eventual outcome of merger regulation. International 
and regional co-operation showed that Botswana was not alone in the 
need to introduce this area of law and to meet international standards in 
its provisions for same. The country placed itself in a good position by 
taking note of its economic state and welfare of citizens.  National 
processes harmonized with lessons from across borders and ensured 
that in the end there were workable provisions on which mergers could 
be regulated.  Nevertheless there were oversights and omissions which 
currently act as impediments to the operation of merger regulation. This 
is both on the part of the actual provisions for merger control and on the 
institutions established for the control of same. Competition law is a 
totally new concept in Botswana and coupled with the enigmatic prima 
facie nature of this type of law, there are high chances that legislation will 
be marred with inefficiencies and drafting errors calling for amendment.  
 Illustrations on the development and nature of requirements in 
respect of mergers in South Africa and Zambia have demonstrated that 












regimes, they have to date been able to establish more articulate and 
definite provisions in respect of merger law. South Africa in particular has 
been able to tackle the issue of merger regulation from a developing 
country perspective to ensure catering to the needs of all its citizens. By 
benchmarking, Botswana was privy to benefit which placed its provisions 
on a better level compared to if there had been no advantage of using 
neighbouring jurisdictions as a springboard. This is more so that these 
jurisdictions had already gone through repealing of their acts to passing 
new laws.  The drafters of the legislation however did not provide 
mechanisms for training of personnel that would be actually involved in 
the ensuring that mergers were correctly regulated. This was perhaps left 
open because of anticipation of on the job training and experience.  
 The final result being that the regulation of mergers in Botswana, 
although workable, has not been provided for to the full extent necessary 
for adequate functioning and requires panel beating in some respects so 
as at to perfect it. 
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
As a way of wrapping up the elucidations made herein, below are 
recommendations on the findings. The engagement by Botswana in the 
elaborate process of preparation for promulgation of legislation shows 
that in finally promulgating the legislation the country could have been 
limited to leave the Act as it is because of limitation of resources, 
expertise and manpower. The recommendations made herein, therefore 
bear in mind that it may take some time for these to be implemented. To 
implement them more resources and expertise will be required. A route 
towards effective amendment and re-structuring could be to return to the 
UNCTAD for assistance, as well as to other competition law networks 
such as the ICN. 
It is recommended that:   
1. The irregularity between section 54 of the Act and regulation 20 












amendment. The provision in the Regulations must be in 
accordance with the Act. Alternatively, the Act could be silent 
on the manner of threshold determination and only state that 
the Minister shall in consultation with the Authority prescribe 
the threshold determination by way of regulation. 
 
2. The legislature should also consider having provisions allowing 
for a change in threshold over time as is the case in South 
Africa. Inclusive in this would be preparation of a merger 
threshold calculator. This would allow for changes depending 
on the economic state of the country at any particular time. It 
would ensure existence of a realist threshold at all times. 
 
 
3.   Mergers falling below thresholds should also be subject to 
regulation where they are likely to have bad impact on the 
competition. This will demonstrate that Botswana is alive to the 
reality that it is not only the mergers above threshold that act as 
a risk to fair competiti n.  
 
4. There is a need for clarity in respect of cross boarder mergers. 
Presently the issue is dealt with in the interpretation of 
application section. However the importance of this issue 
dictates that it is fully dealt with, particularly because an 
effective act catering for cross border mergers may be deemed 
attractive in the international for purposes of investment by 
multinational corporations. 
 
5. The determination period for mergers be increased to 60 days 














6.  Merger notification should go as far as involving notification to 
Trade Unions and Employee representatives personally and 
not only leaving notices up to being in the newspapers. 
 
7. Provisions for government intervention in specified merger 
situations should be introduced. Inclusion of these provisions 
will boost confidence and transparency in the merger system. 
These provisions should go as far as including protection from 
sabotage from government officials based on personal interest. 
 
 
8. The definition section of the Act should also be amended to 
accordingly provide for the office of inspector. Inclusion of the 
failing firm defence is necessary. 
  
9. The institutional bias of the Commission and the Authority 
should be cleared. Structure, constitution and function of these 
offices should be separate and distinct so as to ensure greater 
public confidence in their existence. This should be made clear 
in the legislation by stipulating the independence and 
impartiality of these institutions. 
 
  
10. The appointment of the Chief Executive Officer of the Authority 
and the Commissioner should not only be done in consultation 
with the Minister, but should go as far as the President. A 
committee of experts should be established on an ad hoc basis 
to provide assistance in making these appointments. 
  
11. The Act should also make provision for recusal of officers from 
matters wherein they have a personal interest and also classify 














12. The legislature should also consider assessing the prospects 
and challenges of success of setting up of specialised courts to 
deal with competition cases going forward. This will be an 
immense benefit to the court structure and also ensure that 
institutions are already in place as the economy expands. The 
quorum of these courts could comprise high court judges and 
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